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Behind the Steele Curtain: An




The law on international trademark disputes is founded on
precedent from 1952. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. is the first and only
Supreme Court decision addressing the question of how far the
Lanham Act should be extended beyond the United States' national
borders when international infringement is at issue. The decision laid
the foundation for a three-pronged test that focuses on the factors of
defendant nationality, effects on US commerce, and conflicts with
foreign law. Although international trademark conflicts have
multiplied dramatically-particularly throughout the last
decade-there has been no systematic and comprehensive account of
the actual state of the law. Courts and commentators continue to rely
only on a small set of leading cases-Steele and a handful of appellate
court opinions-when testing the territorial scope of the Lanham Act,
thus ignoring the landscape of lower courts' decision-making. To
address this blind spot, an empirical study of the field's case law from
its inception in 1952 until 2016 was undertaken. The results,
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presented in this Article, reveal that much of the conventional wisdom
regarding the state of judge-made law in trademark conflicts cases is
questionable, if not incorrect. This Article not only provides new and
unexpected insights into the actual extension of US trademark law
beyond national territory but also explains which factors drive the
outcome of extraterritoriality testing in practice, how these factors
interact with one another, and how each factor has been shaped over
time. Based on these findings, this Article suggests everal corrections
to existing doctrine. More succinctly put, in the interest of aligning
judicial practice with the realities of socioeconomic globalization, the
current overextension of the Lanham Act must be curbed. The doctrine
of trademark extraterritoriality that has evolved in the wake of Steele
is an anticompetitive detriment rather than a rights holder panacea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting intellectual property rights in a world of globalized
economies and societies is complicated. The legal environment may
have seemingly become increasingly friendly toward rights holders.
Public international law protection has been on the rise since the
nineteenth century, and most national regimes have increased their
protection standards for intellectual property. Nonetheless, outside
the United States, protection levels are often not as comprehensive
and litigation in foreign jurisdictions is often not as effective.
Therefore, it is not surprising that suing "at home" remains the main
tool for US rights holders seeking protection from cross-border and
transnational infringements. In this regard, examining the categories
of intellectual property reveals a peculiarity: intellectual property law
in the United States is generally governed by the so-called
"territoriality principle"; this principle provides for a limitation of
laws, implying a corresponding limitation of rights.' Within the
1. Trademarks are treated under the same rules as copyrights and patent, design, and
sui generis rights. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 507 (1997); see, e.g., Pers.'s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565,
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umbrella of intellectual property, however, copyright and patent law
seem to follow a different path from trademark law. While the former
are perceived to be strictly territorial, trademark law is said to extend
across national borders, and, to a certain extent, individual rights
seem to be protectable "extraterritorially."2 The usual explanation for
this difference dates back to 1952, when the Supreme Court handed
down its ruling in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.3-the Court's only
precedent on this issue. In Steele, the Court's majority set the stage
for extraterritoriality by emphasizing the "broad jurisdictional grant
in the Lanham Act" as well as the "Act's sweeping reach into 'all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.'"4  A
conventional view further refers to the fact that subsequent courts
have interpreted Steele as establishing a three-pronged
test-considering nationality, effects on US commerce, and conflicts
with foreign law-that must be balanced in order to determine the
scope of the Lanham Act as the federal trademark statute.5 In
essence, current doctrine seems to have evolved from a single
precedent establishing both a wide extension of US rights and a
clear-cut formulaic test structure.
1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching
Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 891-907 (2004); TIM W. DORNIs,
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION CONFLICTS: HISTORICAL-COMPARATIVE, DOCTRINAL, AND
EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 193-200 (2017). For other jurisdictions (e.g., the European Union and
Germany), see, for example, Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II),
2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 42 [hereinafter EC Regulation No. 864/2007]; Karl Kreuzer, in 10
MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH art. 38 EGBGB app. II, ¶ 56 et seq.
(Kurt Rebmann & Jiirgen Sicker eds., 3d ed. 1998).
2. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) ("Our
patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect . . . ."); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower
Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he power [i.e., extraterritorial reach] is more extensive
under the Lanham Act than under the Copyright Act . . . ."); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (copyright territoriality); see also Bradley,
supra note 1, at 520-31.
3. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
4. Id. at 286-87. For court wisdom and commentary, see, for example, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 271 n.11 (2010) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) ("[W]e have since read [Steele] as interpreting the statute at
issue-the Lanham Act-to have extraterritorial effect . . . ."); McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107,
110 (1st Cir. 2005) ("It has long been settled that the Lanham Act can, in appropriate cases, be
applied extraterritorially."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 29:57 (5th ed., 2017) ("The Bulova Watch case results in an extra-territorial
reach for the trademark laws which is considerably broader than that of the patent and
copyright laws.").
5. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1956);
Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 727
(1998); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58.
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However, upon closer scrutiny, the assumption that Steele
established a well-founded, streamlined, and plaintiff-friendly
doctrine begins to falter. Above all, it is far from clear whether the
revered paradigm of extraterritoriality conforms to the realities of
actual court practice. To date, no one has examined the Steele progeny
on their overall test outcomes. Thus, it remains to be seen whether
courts actually extend-or even overextend-the Lanham Act.
Moreover, even if it originates from the Supreme Court, a single
precedent can barely account for the six-decade evolution of legal
doctrine across thirteen US Courts of Appeals. Likewise, it is not
much more plausible that the current status of the law can be
explained by reference to a few leading appellate cases and their
respective interpretations of the Supreme Court's three-pronged test.6
Nevertheless, this is precisely the conventional wisdom told by legal
scholars and commentators who rely on a few handpicked appellate
court decisions to describe the overall state of the law.7 The reality is
that empirical studies are nonexistent, and the actual legal landscape
remains highly vague and subjective. In the words of Karl Llewellyn,
the situation is "pathological"8 : depending on the deciding judge's or
commenting academic's ideas, perceptions, and preferences, the case
law will appear in a light that is different from the reality of day-to-
day court practice.
This Article, which represents the first empirical study of case
law on the issue of Lanham Act extraterritoriality, seeks to address
these concerns and offer a solution that avoids falling prey to
conventional wisdom. The content analysis is based on a data set of
159 federal and state court opinions, from 1952 until the end of 2016,
that made use of the Supreme Court's Steele opinion or any of the
circuit courts' extraterritoriality tests that evolved in its wake.9 The
analysis proceeds as follows: Part II offers insight into the current
doctrine of Lanham Act extraterritoriality, which comprises scholarly
theory and appellate courts' practice concerning cases with
cross-border and transnational elements of trademark infringement.
In addition to the Steele test, the Article examines both the tests
6. For the different test versions, see infra notes 28-58 and 101-04 and accompanying
text.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58 (1930).
9. For a description of the method of so-called "content analysis," see, for example, Fred
Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
133 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2008); Reed C. Lawlor, Fact Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 JURIMETRICS J. 107 (1968).
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developed by different circuits since 1952 and the conventional
wisdom applied in scholarly and practical commentary.
The descriptive Sections of Part III present the results of the
empirical analysis in several steps. Section A starts with a general
overview of the Steele progeny, including the distribution of cases over
time, the cases' venues, and the courts' test variants. That Section
also explores the impact of external influences on the case law at
hand-such as the globalization of trade and commerce, public
international law developments around intellectual property
protection, and the digitization of communication. Section B unveils
the actual scope of the Lanham Act. In addition to explaining the
higher-than-average rate of Lanham Act application, that Section
provides information that can help correct conventional wisdom on the
various appellate court tests' relevance and evolution over time. In
Section C, the empirical picture presents new insights into the
interrelations among the factors in extraterritoriality testing, thereby
determining whether nationality, effects on US commerce, or conflicts
with foreign law ultimately drive the outcome. Section D examines
the evolution of each test factor over time, assessing how each factor
has been modified and remodeled by the courts. Results in that
Section provide the most unexpected and counterintuitive results of
this inquiry. Notably, the development of "effects on US commerce"
into the most influential test element and its widely overlooked
foundation in pre-Lanham Act common law doctrine can be explained
as one of the most determinative features of current law.
The findings in Parts II and III provide a rich groundwork for a
structured economic analysis in Part IV. That Part's normative
analysis is oriented toward the future: it addresses the regulatory
aspects of trademark extraterritoriality and the fact that theory and
practice still seem oblivious to the "hidden economics" of trademark
conflicts law.
II. BACKGROUND
When a US trademark seems to be infringed in an
international transaction, the owner has two options. First, she may
sue abroad. The case will then likely be subject to the application of
foreign trademark law.10 Alternatively, she may sue in a US federal
10. See, e.g., EC Regulation No. 864/2007, supra note 1, at 45. On European choice of
law, see DORNIS, supra note 1, at 190-200.
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court." The second option is usually preferred since the level of rights
protection and the procedural setting are more inviting in the United
States.12  Because federal courts will generally not apply foreign
trademark law, they will either rely on the Lanham Act to grant
protection, or they will dismiss the case.13 This explains why the Act's
territorial scope is of the essence.14 Although there is a general
presumption under the Constitution that US law is to be applied
territorially,15 the vigor of this presumption varies. In Steele, the
Supreme Court set sail for an extension of the Lanham Act,
weakening the presumption.16 In the wake of this ruling, circuit
11. Cases concerning the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act are primarily
filed in federal courts. As the summary statistics reveal, only 2 out of 159 opinions were issued
by state courts. See infra Part III.A.1.
12. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 491 (2003); Thomas Berner,
Case Note, Wells Fargo & Company v. Wells Fargo Express Company, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1977), 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 173-74 (1979); Brendan J. Witherell, Note, Trademark
Law-The Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act: The First Circuit Cuts the Fat from the
Vanity Fair Test, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193, 204 (2006).
13. Bradley, supra note 1, at 576-77.
14. More recently, it has been debated whether the scope of the Lanham Act is an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction or a merits question. Notably, the US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that the reach of the Lanham Act is a merits question. See Trader Joe's
Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 966-68 (9th Cir. 2016); Philippe Charriol Int'l Ltd. v. A'lor Int'l Ltd.,
611 F. App'x 890, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2015); La Quinta Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V.,
762 F.3d 867, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2014). This holding is based on recent Supreme Court case law
addressing federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction with respect to employment law, see
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512-16 (2006), and securities regulation, see Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010). None of these opinions, however, concerned
the Lanham Act, and many courts and commentators still treat extraterritoriality as a
"jurisdictional" issue. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283-85 (1952). In
addition, there has been no Supreme Court decision on Lanham Act extraterritoriality since
1952, when the issue was expressly considered "jurisdictional." See id. For examples of a
jurisdictional characterization, see Commodores Entertainment Corp. v. McClary, 648 F. App'x
771, 778 (11th Cir. 2016); Sturm v. Armscor Precision International, Inc., No. 14-CV-194-SM,
2016 WL 4385886, at *4 (D.N.H. Aug. 17, 2016); Toyo Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kabusikiki Kaisha
Tokyo Hihoon Rubber Corp., No. 2:14-CV-01847-JAD-VCF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77142, at
*3-5 (D. Nev. June 15, 2015); JMC Rest. Holdings, LLC v. Pevida, No. 14 Civ. 6157(WFK)(VMS),
2015 WL 2240492, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015). For legal commentary on subject matter
jurisdiction, see, for example, MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58. In any event, characterization of
Lanham Act extraterritoriality does not change the substance of this Article's analysis. It will
thus refer to the issue as "extraterritoriality."
15. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013); Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
16. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 286.
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courts have developed and remodeled the three-pronged Steele test,
creating their own, mostly further extended, variants.17
A. Lanham Act Extraterritoriality
The question of how far federal trademark law can be extended
beyond national borders first emerged in 1952 in the Steele case.18
Sidney Steele, the primary defendant, was a US citizen residing in
Texas. Plaintiff Bulova Watch Company, one of the largest watch
manufacturers at the time, had a US trademark registration for its
watches under the name "Bulova" but did not have any Mexican
trademarks. Taking advantage of this vacuum, Steele procured a
trademark registration for "Bulova" in Mexico. He bought watch parts
in Switzerland and in the United States. However, he assembled the
parts, stamped the watches with the mark, and sold the watches
solely in Mexico. Contesting Steele's actions, Bulova filed a lawsuit in
Texas.19 The district court dismissed the case on the ground that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.20 The US Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed,21 and the Supreme Court affirmed.22 As the
majority explained:
"[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of i[t]s own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed." . . .
[The defendant's] operations and their effects were not confined within the
territorial limits of a foreign nation. He bought component parts of his wares in
the United States, and spurious "Bulovas" filtered through the Mexican border into
this country; his competing goods could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch
Company's trade reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as well as
abroad. Under similar factual circumstances, courts of the United States have
awarded relief to registered trademark owners, even prior to the advent of the
broadened commerce provisions of the Lanham Act.2 3
Stating that, in the meantime, Mexican courts had canceled
Steele's Mexican "Bulova" registration, the majority concluded that
17. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2005); Am. Rice, Inc. v.
Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1956).
18. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281.
19. Id. at 281-82, 284-85.
20. Id. at 282.
21. Id.; Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280
(1952).
22. Steele, 344 U.S. at 289.
23. Id. at 285-87 (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1914)).
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there was no conflict with foreign law that could impede the
application of the Lanham Act. 2 4
Steele has been interpreted as establishing two different bases
for extraterritoriality. First, even though buying spare parts in the
United States did not constitute an infringement, the Court described
these purchases as "essential steps in the course of business
consummated abroad" and added that "acts in themselves legal lose
that character when they become part of an unlawful scheme."25 In
addition, the Court described the "filtering" of counterfeits into the
United States as an impairment of the owner's goodwill; more
concretely, the Court emphasized that "competing goods could well
reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's trade reputation in
markets cultivated by advertising here as well as abroad."26 This last
aspect not only made domestic effects an element of regulation but
also set the stage for a transformation of traditional common law
rights doctrine-notably the conception of use-based rights-into a
paradigm of transnational goodwill extension.27
Most courts have subsequently interpreted Steele as
establishing three factors: (1) the defendant's nationality or
citizenship, (2) effects on US commerce, and (3) conflicts or potential
conflicts with foreign law ("Bulova factors").28 A variety of different
circuit tests have emerged from these factors. Most prominently
among them are the Second Circuit's Vanity Fair formula,29 the Fifth
Circuit's American Rice variant,3 0 and the Ninth Circuit's Wells Fargo
rule of reason.31 In addition, and more recently, the First Circuit has
established a new test variant in McBee v. Delica Co. 3 2
24. See id. at 289.
25. Id. at 287. This unlawful-scheme paradigm would develop into a characteristic of the
Steele progeny. See infra Part III.D.4.a.
26. Steele, 344 U.S. at 286.
27. See infra Part III.D.4.a.
28. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58 (including further reference to case law in
the circuits). For an early interpretation in scholarly commentary, see Jack J. Rappeport,
Trade-Mark and Unfair Competition in International Conflict of Laws: An Analysis of the Choice
of Law Problem, 20 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 16 (1958). For clarity, note that the order of the test
factors is not uniform. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir.
1956) (ordering effects before defendant nationality and conflicts); Hong Leong Fin. Ltd.
(Singapore) v. Pinnacle Performance Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 6010(JMF), 2013 WL 5746126, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (explaining nationality and conflicts as the first and second factors, and
effects as the third). However, for this analysis, I will use the conventional explanation of the
order of the factors as established in court practice and scholarly commentary. See, e.g.,
MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:57.
29. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642-43.
30. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983).
31. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
32. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2005).
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In Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit became the first US Court of
Appeals to apply the Bulova factors.33 The plaintiff in that 1956 case
was a Pennsylvania corporation that sold women's underwear under
the mark "Vanity Fair" in the United States (since 1914) and Canada
(since 1917). The defendant was a Canadian corporation that had
been granted a Canadian trademark registration for "Vanity Fair" for
similar products, which it began selling in 1915. Due to the
defendant's prior rights, the plaintiff was denied registration in
Canada. When the defendant started selling both the plaintiffs
"Vanity Fair" products and its own merchandise under the same
brand, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant's use
in both Canada and the United States.34 In its ruling, the Second
Circuit began by analyzing the Supreme Court's Bulova factors and
then offered its own interpretation: First, the defendant's conduct
needed to have a "substantial" effect on US commerce. Second, the
defendant had to be a US citizen. And finally, conflicts with foreign
law were to be avoided.35 In Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit rejected
extraterritorial relief since the defendant was considered to be a
foreign citizen acting under a valid foreign trademark.36 For more
than two decades, this remained the only interpretation of the Bulova
factors.
In the 1970s, the Ninth Circuit developed another test variant.
In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., the appellate court
formulated a then-novel rule of reason approach for assessing Lanham
Act extraterritoriality.37 The plaintiff used its registered trademark
"Wells Fargo" throughout the United States. The defendant, a foreign
corporation, was using the same trademark in the United States and
Europe.38 After the district court rejected subject matter jurisdiction
under Vanity Fair,39 the Ninth Circuit vacated that ruling and
developed a circuit-specific test based on the "jurisdictional rule of
reason" already established in the circuit's international antitrust
precedent in Timberlane Lumber Co. u. Bank of America.40 This test
33. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 641-42.
34. Id. at 637-38.
35. See id. at 642.
36. Id. at 643.
37. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. Id. at 411.
39. Id. at 411-12; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065,
1076-78 (D. Nev. 1973).
40. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976). For the "jurisdictional rule of reason" terminology, see also Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at
427-28, 431.
576 [Vol. 20:3:567
BEHIND THE STEELE CURTAIN
required only "some" effects on US commerce,4 1 along with an
additional balancing of seven comity factors:
[1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, [2] the nationality or allegiance
of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, [3]
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, [4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, [5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, [6] the foreseeability of such effect, and [7] the relative
importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
42
The Ninth Circuit's balancing approach has been interpreted
as standing "in stark contrast" to the Supreme Court's and Second
Circuit's allegedly bright-line tests.43 Whereas the two latter tests
require consideration of three test factors, the Timberlane formula
seems to establish a more sophisticated analysis, providing for
significant leeway in interpretation.4 4
The First Circuit developed the most recent test in the 2005
case McBee v. Delica Co.4 5 The plaintiff there, an American jazz
musician, sued a Japanese clothing retailer that adopted the
trademark "Cecil McBee" (identical to the plaintiffs name) for its
young women's clothing line. The retailer held a Japanese trademark.
Although the company did not market its products outside of Japan, it
did display the trademark on its website.46  After the plaintiffs
unsuccessful attempt to have the trademark invalidated in the
Japanese trademark registry, he filed a complaint asserting
trademark dilution and unfair competition.47 The district court found
Vanity Fair persuasive, but the First Circuit formulated a new test:
Under the McBee standard, an inquiry into the defendant's nationality
is the mandatory first step of a two-pronged analysis.48  If the
defendant is not a US national, "substantial effects" on commerce will
become the determinative factor.49  Similar to the Wells Fargo
standard, this test borrows from international antitrust law.50
However, it diverges from both Vanity Fair and Wells Fargo in one
41. Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 428.
42. Id. at 428-29 (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 614-15).
43. See, e.g., Witherell, supra note 12, at 211. For conventional wisdom on the
differences between the tests, see infra Part II.C.2.
44. For arguments that the Ninth Circuit's test would offer more options for
manipulating the facts and, thus, ultimately result in legal uncertainty, see infra Part III.B.
45. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 111-15.
47. Id. at 113, 115.
48. Id. at 116, 121.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 119-23.
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important aspect: a separate comity analysis is undertaken only in
order to determine whether the jurisdiction that has been found to
exist should be exercised.51
Among the cases decided in other circuits,52 the Fifth Circuit
stands out in its American Rice decision, which involved a remarkable
extraterritorial extension of rights protection.53 The Fifth Circuit first
formulated this test in 1983. Although similar to Vanity Fair in its
requirement of three test factors, the test limits the quantitative
inquiry to "some effect"-that is, "more than an insignificant
effect"-thereby replicating the Ninth Circuit's approach.54  In
American Rice, both parties were US farmers' marketing cooperatives
acting in the United States and abroad.5 5 The defendant was selling
rice in Saudi Arabia under a trademark similar to the plaintiffs US
registration.5 6 Even though the sales at issue occurred solely in Saudi
Arabia and "none of [the] products found their way back into the
United States," the court applied the Lanham Act.5 7 Effects on US
commerce were seen in the defendant's Saudi Arabian sales,
particularly on the basis that the processing, packaging,
transportation, and distribution of US-produced rice constituted
activities "within commerce."58
B. Scholarly Debate and Conventional Wisdom
Scholarly debate does not challenge the theory that the
Lanham Act's broad jurisdictional scope has resulted in a significant
extension of rights. Indeed, this assumption is widely shared.59 The
battle is fought on a different field. Roughly speaking, there are two
opposing camps. One argues that protection should be oriented along
the lines of political territoriality, and the other demands extended
51. Id. at 121.
52. For an overview, see, for example, MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58; Gary D. Feldon,
Comment, The Antitrust Model of Extraterritorial Trademark Jurisdiction: Analysis and
Predictions After F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 651, 660-73 (2006).
53. See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir.
1983).
54. Id. at 414 & n.8.
55. Id. at 410-11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 410, 414.
58. Id. For later affirmation, see American Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518
F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2008).
59. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:55.25; Bradley, supra note 1, at 527; Roger
E. Schechter, The Case for Limited Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
619, 627 (1997).
578 [Vol. 20:3:567
BEHIND THE STEELE CURTAIN
protection-notably of US right owners-by means of
extraterritoriality.
Most prominent among the territorialists is Curtis A. Bradley,
who proposes to distinguish between territoriality and
extraterritoriality based on whether the law at issue concerns the
protection of private rights or caters to the regulation of the whole
economy.60 Accordingly, he distinguishes intellectual property law on
one side from antitrust and securities law on the other. The latter
areas of regulation, he explains, are designed to protect the public
interest and the economy as a whole.6 1  Extraterritoriality is
inherent.62 Quite differently, he considers intellectual property rights
to benefit society by "conferring particular property rights on
individuals and companies."63 Thus, the scope of intellectual property
rights should remain national and there should be no
extraterritoriality. Ultimately, Bradley suggests applying foreign
laws to conduct that occurs abroad.64
Roger E. Schechter represents the extraterritorialist
counterapproach.65  In explaining his idea of "domestic
extraterritoriality," he distinguishes trademarks from copyrights and
patents. Neither copyright nor patent law extends the geographical
scope of preexisting common law rights. Copyrights and patents were
always conceived of as being nationwide. Accordingly, the copyright
and patent statutes did not change the territorial character of these
rights. The perception was different, however, for the Lanham Act.
As Schechter explains, "trademark law was originally grounded on an
explicitly territorial foundation."66  Furthermore, since use-based
common law rights were territorial, he concludes the Lanham Act's
nationwide extension of rights established an extraterritorial scope of
rights.67 In addition to this extraterritoriality-by-statute paradigm,
Schechter asserts a pragmatic argument in favor of extending the
60. Bradley, supra note 1, at 568-69.
61. Id. at 568.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 569.
64. Id. at 576, 582. For commentary on whether foreign law should be applied to conduct
that occurs abroad, see also Robert Alpert, The Export of Trademarked Goods from the United
States: The Extraterritorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 125, 148 n.105 (1991);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise
of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 716-17 (2009); Pamela E. Kraver & Robert E.
Purcell, Application of the Lanham Act to Extraterritorial Activities: Trend Toward Universality
or Imperialism?, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 115, 115-16 (1995).
65. See Schechter, supra note 59, at 620.
66. See id. at 627.
67. See id.
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scope of trademark protection-the need to protect US rights holders
from harmful activities that occur abroad.68
Specifically, Schechter's differentiation between use-based and
registered rightS69-the former territorial, the latter
extraterritorial-may appear to be somewhat dubious. After all, a
registered right is confined to the national territory, making it a
territorial right by definition.70 According to Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
however, two elements of trademark territoriality-intrinsic
territoriality and political territoriality 71-must be differentiated.
Common law rights may extend extraterritorially through the rights
holders' foreign-based activity and use of a trademark in the
marketplace.72 Accordingly, their "territoriality is rooted in social and
commercial practices, which increasingly transcend national
borders."73 Registered rights, on the other hand, are by definition
inextricably tied to lawmakers' power and authority. This confines
the scope of their protection to the political territory. Seen in this
light, it is evident that any approach to the issue of extraterritoriality
must focus on the common law foundations of US trademark law. All
rights-no matter whether they are registered or use based-may be
considered to be political. Yet the idea of a close correlation between
marketplace extension and the scope of rights still dominates legal
theory in the field. 74 Indeed, as the analysis below reveals, it actually
is the intrinsic extraterritoriality of common law rights-their
tendency to transcend political borders both within the United States
and internationally-that still determines the practice of trademark
conflicts law.76
Moreover, the debate is not limited to the doctrinal-theoretical
plane. Indeed, many scholarly commentators have set their feet on
swampy ground when addressing the more mundane questions
regarding how courts are actually deciding trademark conflicts. Most
68. Id. at 624, 628; see also Feldon, supra note 52, at 680. For an approval in practice of
a pragmatic approach, see, for example, McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 125 (1st Cir. 2005).
For a critique, see infra Part IV.B.2.a.
69. See Schechter, supra note 59, at 625-26.
70. See id. at 626.
71. Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 885, 901, 908; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 64, at 725
n.49. For a similar and very appropriate distinction founded on a trademark's "legal
territoriality" and the counterpart of "collective 'consumer consciousness' that easily crosses
national borders, see Graeme W. Austin, The Story of Steele v. Bulova: Trademarks on the Line,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 395, 420, 422 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
72. See Dinwoodie, supra note 1, at 900.
73. Id.
74. See DORNIS, supra note 1, at 127-51.
75. See infra Part III.D.4.
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generally, scholarly commentary claims that US courts have a
penchant for applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially.76 A more
specific facet of this wisdom suggests that courts tend to favor US
plaintiffs over foreign defendants in an attempt to compensate for the
lack of protection for domestic rights holders abroad.77 Furthermore,
because the Supreme Court has provided little interpretative
guidance, commentators assume that the circuit courts produce erratic
interpretations and varying outcomes that ultimately favor forum
shopping.7 8 In fact, commentators have even lamented an "enormous
inconsistency in the tests" rather than labeling the variants a "circuit
split."7 9 Indeed, the tests from the Second and Ninth Circuits-Vanity
Fair and Wells Fargo's Timberlane rule, respectively-have been
described as fundamentally different.8 0 Scholarly analyses explain
Vanity Fair as "restrictive" and "narrow," notably for its requirement
that effects be "substantial" and its allowance for jurisdiction to be
refused if one test prong fails.8 1 The Ninth Circuit's "balancing
76. See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 64, at 125 ("[C]ourts have taken an expansive view on
the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act."); Erika M. Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of
United States Trademark Law: A Review of Recent Decisions Under the Lanham Act, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 863, 864 (1999) ("[R]ecent case law from the Second, Ninth, and
Fifth Circuits reflects a trend toward a broadened application of the Lanham Act."); Kraver &
Purcell, supra note 64, at 116, 137 ("U.S. courts possess the commendable attitude that where
there is a wrong, there should be a remedy. . . . U.S. courts are exceedingly quick to determine
the appropriate remedies according to U.S. laws and to use the power and authority of the U.S.
courts to enforce those remedies."); Nguyen, supra note 12, at 494 ("Bulova signaled a judicial
trend of extending the application of the Lanham Act extraterritorially."); Anna R. Popov, Note,
Watering Down Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. to Reach E-Commerce Overseas: Analyzing the
Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Under International Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 707 (2004)
("[T]hrough the evolution of case law, the extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act over
trademarks on the Internet may be overextensive and unjustified under international legal
principles.").
77. See Popov, supra note 76, at 722.
78. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 529; Feldon, supra note 52, at 673.
79. See Feldon, supra note 52, at 653.
80. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58 & n.6; Bradley, supra note 1, at 529;
Schechter, supra note 59, at 635; Berner, supra note 12, at 190; Robert Butts, Note, Trademark
Law: Interpreting the Congressional Intent of the Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 447, 463, 467-68 (1993); Susan Lutinger, Recent Decision,
World Book v. International Business Machines Corp. 354 F. Supp.2d 451 (S.D.N. Y Feb. 3,
2005), 19 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 163, 167 (2006); Sarah Thomas-Gonzalez, Comment, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Lanham Act: American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Ricegrowers Cooperative Ass'n,
11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 411, 419, 431 (1985); Jason Webster, Case Comment, McBee v. Delica Co.,
Ltd., 417 F3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005), 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 263, 267-68; Witherell, supra
note 12, at 211-12; Kathryn Zeitung, Case Note, Lanham Act Imperialism: A Case Note, 12 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 408, 413 (2001).
81. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 529; Brown, supra note 76, at 881; Nguyen, supra note
12, at 497 n.70; Serge G. Avakian, Comment, Global Unfair Competition in the Online Commerce
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approach," by contrast, is seen as giving the courts "more latitude in
extending jurisdiction."82 With general skepticism toward open-ended
balancing approaches, the Timberlane rule of reason is even said to
have "created uncertainty where certainty existed."83
Yet other views exist. Specifically, courts themselves seem to
harbor a perspective of harmony, if not uniformity. For example, a
district court in the Seventh Circuit described the Second and Ninth
Circuit tests as "very similar" and producing "the same results when
applied."84 Some voices in scholarly commentary even expect the
Ninth Circuit to be more deferential to internationalist concerns,
therefore limiting the reach of US law, granting more discretion, and
resulting in "better" results in terms of justice.8 5
Finally, it is no surprise that commentators dispute which
Bulova factor-nationality, effects on US commerce, or conflicts with
foreign law-drives the test's outcome. In this regard, for instance, it
has been contended that the qualification of effects-as "substantial,"
"significant," or "some"-will determine the ultimate reach of the
Lanham Act.8 6  Furthermore, the interplay among the three factors
seems to make a difference: Overall, there is no doubt that courts do
"balance" the factors,87 but the implications of such balancing are still
widely unexplored. Most interestingly, although effects on US
commerce is sometimes perceived as the most important factor8 8-and
courts in the Vanity Fair line expressly adhere to a doctrine of
nationality-and-conflicts dominance89-there are no detailed
Era, 46 UCLA L. REV. 905, 923-24 (1999); Berner, supra note 12, at 190; Popov, supra note 76, at
716, 718, 720; Thomas-Gonzalez, supra note 80, at 431, 434; Witherell, supra note 12, at 212.
82. Popov, supra note 76, at 716; see also Avakian, supra note 81, at 923; Butts, supra
note 80, at 469; Thomas-Gonzalez, supra note 80, at 431; Witherell, supra note 12, at 211-12.
83. Berner, supra note 12, at 192; see also Brown, supra note 76, at 883; James W.
Dabney, On the Territorial Reach of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 465, 478 (1993).
84. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 838, 842 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
("The Ninth Circuit test is merely a more detailed version of the Bulova test. Therefore, this
Court will analyze this case based on the Bulova test as amplified by the Second, Fifth and Ninth
Circuits in the absence of a Seventh Circuit decision.").
85. See Witherell, supra note 12, at 212; Brown, supra note 76, at 882-83.
86. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 76, at 880-82; Dabney, supra note 83, at 478.
87. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 527-28 ("[Courts] have applied a variety of
balancing tests to limit the Lanham Act's extraterritorial effect."); Dinwoodie, supra note 64, at
780-81.
88. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 n.4 (2d Cir.
1998) ("Indeed, we have never applied the Lanham Act to extraterritorial conduct absent a
substantial effect on United States commerce."); see also Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee
Hosiery, 47 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D.N.J. 1999).
89. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1956) ("[T]he
Lanham Act .. . should not be given an extraterritorial application against foreign citizens acting
under presumably valid trade-marks in a foreign country."). For more recent case law, see, for
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explorations into the relevance and impact of single factors. As a
result, it remains unclear which factor or combination of factors drives
the extraterritoriality tests.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
As revealed in Part II, a wide array of assumptions exists not
only with regard to legal doctrine but also with respect to the practical
aspects of trademark extraterritoriality. This polyphonic concert shall
be the starting point. The formulaic structure of the test variants, as
well as most courts' adherence to this structure, provides a convenient
ground for a systematic study. This Part accordingly presents the
data to substantiate-though mostly to dispel-many of the
assumptions developed under and upheld by conventional wisdom.90
A. Summary Statistics
1. Overall Population
From 1952 to the end of 2016, federal courts (and two state
courts) produced 159 database-accessible opinions (from 133 actual
disputes)91 that made substantial92 use of the three test factors or one
of the circuit court test variants.93 This produces an average of 2.05
disputes per year during the period under study. On its face, this
number seems low. 9 4 Upon closer scrutiny, however, the outcome is
not too perplexing. After all, this study is concerned with a fraction of
example, Gelicity UK Ltd. v. Jell-E-Bath, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 5677(ILG)(RLM), 2013 WL 3315398,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).
90. For some analyses in the following Part, the opinions were grouped in accordance
with the actual dispute at bar (i.e., the court litigation with identical (or almost identical)
parties). Each district court opinion and the corresponding appellate court decision were thus
counted as a single dispute only. The majority of the analyses, however, derived from all of the
sampled opinions. In the interest of achieving a sufficiently large sample of observations, it was
not further differentiated with regard to procedural posture.
91. The empirical data presented throughout Parts III and IV are on file with the
Author and are available upon request. See infra Appendix.
92. For an explanation of "substantial," see infra Appendix.
93. The population includes reported and unreported opinions, including 155 lower
federal court cases, see infra, Figure 2, two state high court cases, and two opinions from the US
Supreme Court. For limitations to the precedential effect of unreported opinions, see Jason B.
Binimow, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105 AM. L. REPS. 5th 499 (2003). For a
description of the case selection and coding methodology, see infra Appendix.
94. This is the case particularly if the numbers are compared with the overall amount of
trademark disputes in the same time span. A cursory Westlaw search for "trademark
infringement" yields over 9,000 cases between 1952 and 2016. For an overview of intellectual
property litigation numbers in the United States, see also Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S.
District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWAL. REV. 1065 (2016).
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the universe of trademark conflicts. Litigation occurs only rarely,
since most cases are settled or not "disputed" at all.9 5  More
complexities of the composition of litigated cases will be addressed
later on.96 Another aspect is interesting to note: As can be seen in
Figure 1, a constant rise in case numbers has occurred.97 Yet unlike
what was predicted throughout the 1990s, the ascent was never
extraordinarily steep.98 Only toward the end of the observation period
did the case numbers grow significantly. More than a third of all
disputes were decided in 2010 or after, yielding exactly 7.0 disputes
per year. It is thus not overly daring to suggest that the issue of
Lanham Act extraterritoriality is not only here to stay for some time
but also may require more attention in the near future.
Figure 1.








----- 8-year-moving-avg. (district court opinions)
95. This fact accounts for the specific composition of cases that are actually litigated. See
infra Part III.B.1.
96. See infra Part III.B. 1.
97. See infra Figure 1.
98. See, e.g., Kraver & Purcell, supra note 64, at 115; Bradley, supra note 1, at 506;
Burk, supra note 5, at 729-31; Richard L. Garnett, Trademarks and the Internet: Resolution of
International IP Disputes by Unilateral Application of U.S. Laws, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 925, 926
(2005); Nguyen, supra note 12, at 490-91; Avakian, supra note 81, at 913; Popov, supra note 76,
at 706; Webster, supra note 80, at 269.
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2. Circuit and District Courts
Examining the numbers in the circuit and district courts
highlights some peculiarities. As Figure 2 illustrates, 55.97% of all
opinions were issued by courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits. The
Second Circuit leads with 28.30% (45 opinions), closely followed by the
Ninth Circuit's 27.67% (44 opinions). All other circuits number in the
single digits.99 Among US district courts, the US District Court for
the Southern District of New York is the uncontested champion. This
court alone accounts for 20.75% of all opinions (33 out of 159). The
Central and Northern Districts of California follow with 11 and 10
opinions, respectively (6.92% and 6.29%), followed by the Northern
District of Illinois (5.66%, or 9 opinions) and the District of Nevada
(3.77%, or 6 opinions).1 00
Figure 2.
Distribution of Opinions across Circuits
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99. Courts of the Eleventh Circuit decided 8.81% of the opinions studied (14 opinions)
and courts of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits each decided 8.18% (13 opinions). Courts of the
Third Circuit account for 3.77% of the opinions (6 opinions) and courts of the First and Fourth
Circuits each decided 3.14% (5 opinions). Courts of the Tenth Circuit delivered 2 opinions
(1.26%), and the Federal Circuit delivered 2 opinions (majority and dissent) on 1 dispute (1.26%).
Finally, the Eighth and DC Circuits each account for only 1 opinion (0.63%). See infra Figure 2.
100. The Southern and Middle Districts of Florida account for 3.14% and 2.52% of the
total number of opinions studied (5 and 4 opinions, respectively), and the Southern District of
Texas also delivered 4 opinions (2.52%). Among the other districts, none produced more than 3
opinions. See infra Figure 2.
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3. Test Variants
Focusing on the proliferation of test variants outside their
"mother" circuit provides another interesting insight. In this regard,
the Second Circuit's Vanity Fair test clearly dominates the picture.
Overall, 35.22% of all opinions (56 out of 159) applied the Vanity Fair
test-including 37 opinions issued by the Second Circuit and 19
opinions by other circuits. Looking at all three-pronged test
variants-including American Rice and other unspecified
variants-the data show that 52.20% of all opinions (83 out of 159)
followed either Vanity Fair or one of its variants. The Ninth Circuit's
test variant has populated other circuits as well, albeit to a much
smaller extent. Among 41 opinions (25.79%), courts in three other
circuits have made use of the Timberlane rule of reason.101
In addition, the Second and Ninth Circuits provide a rich
source of citations for other courts.102 Even though a circuit's case
output as such may not be very meaningful on its own, the
precedential significance of this output can help measure these cases'
intercircuit importance.103  The Supreme Court's Steele decision
illustrates this effect, as 72.90% of the 155 subsequent lower court
opinions have cited to that case. Interestingly, 71.11% of the opinions
issued by the Second Circuit and only 52.27% of those issued by the
Ninth Circuit cited to Steele-compared to 87.88% of cases in all other
circuits.
The Second Circuit's case law has had a remarkable impact
across all other circuits. Of all post-1956 opinions, 57.89% cited to
Vanity Fair or other Second Circuit precedent; outside the Second
Circuit, the rate was 43.12%. After its inception in 1977, the Ninth
Circuit's Wells Fargo test was cited in 48.65% of opinions across all
circuits, and 29.91% outside the Ninth Circuit. Considering the test's
younger age, it was more frequently referred to than its 1956
counterpart. While Vanity Fair was cited approvingly an average of
1.466 times per year, Wells Fargo's rule of reason achieved an average
of 1.846 yearly references after its founding.
101. See Alcar Grp., Inc. v. Corp. Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 948, 951 (N.D.
Ill. 2000); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Sebelen, 930 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D.P.R. 1996); Playboy Enters. v.
Chuckleberry Pub., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 486, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
102. This analysis looks only at citations that have "precedential" quality, disregarding
citations to the lower court (or courts) in the same dispute, as well as obvious nonprecedential
citations (such as "but see" or another kind of rejection). Multiple citations to the same case were
counted only once. For a similar approach, see William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976).
103. See Landes & Posner, supra note 102, at 293.
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The Fifth Circuit's impact, meanwhile, has been quite
surprising. Even though that circuit's raw output constitutes a mere
8.18% of all opinions, its American Rice precedent was referred to in
34.04% of all post-1983 opinions, with an average of 1.455 citations
per year. Also remarkable with respect to the rate of citations per
year, the First Circuit's McBee precedent had 1.7273 annual
references. Finally, worth mentioning-for it reflects the low impact
of academic legal thought-is the fact that, overall, only 10.69% of all
opinions (17 out of 159) cited to a scholarly resource, such as a law
review article or legal treatise.104
4. Communication Means, Subject Matter, and Geography
Predictably, modern communication has played a dominant
role in recent case law.105 Throughout the last fifteen years, the
number of opinions concerning disputes in which the alleged
infringement occurred through websites or emails has constantly
grown. Prior to 2000, all infringements alleged by the plaintiffs
occurred in an offline environment. Between 2000 and 2006, 31.58%
of opinions involved the use of online media. In opinions issued after
that time, the proportion of online-media infringements rose to
72.73%.
With respect to the kinds of products at issue in international
trademark disputes, the manufacturing, advertising, and sale of
allegedly counterfeited "tangibles" (i.e., goods) continue to account for
the bulk of cases. Overall, among 133 total disputes, 117 (73.58%)
dealt only with allegedly infringing goods, while 36 (22.64%)
concerned services only. Interestingly, over time the proportion of
products involved has changed. Prior to 2000, 81.48% of cases
concerned goods and 11.11% concerned services. After 2004, by
contrast, 65.22% of cases concerned goods and 31.88% concerned
services.
Finally, with respect to the jurisdictions involved, the case
population illustrates the globalization of world trade in recent
decades. Whereas infringements occurring in either Canada or
Mexico made up 85.71% of all litigation before 1979, the location of
infringing activities litigated in US courts began shifting in the 1980s.
From 1979 until the end of 1999, infringements in Canada, Mexico,
104. Among the circuit courts, the rate of citation to scholarly sources was 21.21% (7 out
of 33); at the district court level, it was 7.38% (9 out of 122).
105. The following analysis is based primarily on the sample of actual disputes.
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and Europe accounted for 22.22% of all opinions.106 Asian countries
were involved in 26.67% of the cases,107 and 40.00% dealt with alleged
infringements in multiple jurisdictions on different continents.
Interestingly, from 2000 forward, these numbers did not change too
much. By 2016, North America and Europe together accounted for
29.63% of all cases,108 while Asia accounted for 27.16%. Claims
concerning multiple jurisdictions could be found in 33.33% of all
opinions.109
5. Reversal, Dissent, and Appeal Rates
Viewing the case population in light of the fact that only one
Supreme Court case speaks to this issue, the field is far less in flux
than might be expected. Indeed, the actual numbers facially
contradict the conventional wisdom that Steele left the lower courts
"struggling" with too many issues.110 Among the 122 district court
opinions, 24 were appealed (for an appeal rate of 19.67%). Among
these, 19 opinions (15.57%) were affirmed and 5 (4.1%) were reversed.
These numbers roughly correspond to data in other areas." In
copyright fair use opinions, for instance, the appeal rate between 1978
and 2005 was 25.1%, with an affirmation rate of 16.6% and a reversal
rate of 8.5%.112
This observation holds at the appellate level as well. Overall,
the population consisted of 33 circuit court opinions, of which 3 were
dissenting opinions (9.09%). There were no concurring opinions. Of
the 30 majority opinions, 6 reversed the lower court's opinion (for a
106. About 6.67% of disputes originated from infringing activity occurring in North
America, while about 15.56% originated from activity in Europe.
107. This comparatively modest proportion somewhat contrasts with reports on pervasive
infringements in Asia. See, e.g., Feldon, supra note 52, at 651 n.1 ("Two-thirds of counterfeit
goods intercepted by the U.S. customs service come from China." (citing Sarah Schafer, A Piracy
Culture: Beijing Continues to Defy U.S. and European Efforts to Stop IP Theft, NEWSWEEK INT'L,
Jan. 16, 2006, at 35)).
108. Out of that percentage, 11.11% of the cases concerned Europe and 18.52% concerned
North America.
109. South America, Australia, Oceania, and Africa never played a significant role,
together accounting for only 4.44% (South America only) between 1979 and 2000 and 4.93%
(South America and Australia) after 2000.
110. But see Bradley, supra note 1, at 528.
111. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried
Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
659, 664 tbl.1 (2004) (showing a 10.9% appeal rate for all district court cases and a 21.0% appeal
rate for all district court cases with a judgment for the plaintiff or defendant between 1987 and
1996).
112. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 575 (2008).
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reversal rate of 20%). Here as well, the numbers do not diverge
drastically from those in other areas of litigation: among all circuit
courts, the reversal rate appears to be around 30%, with dissents
appearing in 6%-10% of all cases.113 By comparison, the reversal rate
for copyright fair use cases is 33.8%, with dissenting opinions
occurring in 14.1% of those cases.114
B. Extraterritoriality Rate
One of the most interesting characteristics of this case
population is the win rate on Lanham Act extraterritoriality-in other
words, how often courts actually applied the Lanham Act in
cross-border and transnational trademark conflicts. This
"extraterritoriality rate" can be seen from different perspectives.11 5
The most basic perspective examines the composition of cases litigated
in US courts. Variations of the rates over time, communication
means, circuits, test variants, and the treatment of national and
foreign parties provide interesting insights as well.
1. Theories and Practice of Win-Rate Analysis
Starting with the plain numbers, across the case population
courts found in favor of Lanham Act application in 60.67% of all
opinions (91 out of 150).116 This win rate seems to support the idea
that US judges prefer to extend domestic law rather than disappoint
US rights holders.117  However, a closer look reveals a different
picture.
113. See, e.g., Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the
Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & SOCY REV. 163, 177 tbl.1 (2006) (showing
summary statistics regarding reversals in each circuit from 1980 to 2002); see also DONALD R.
SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 105 tbl.5.1 (2000); Burton Atkins, Interventions and Power in
Judicial Hierarchies: Appellate Courts in England and the United States, 24 LAW & SoC'Y REV.
71, 83-93 (1990) (discussing rates of reversal by UK and US appellate courts); Sean Farhang &
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 299, 306 (2004).
114. See Beebe, supra note 112, at 574.
115. To be precise, the "extraterritoriality rate" is the fraction of wins on the issue of
Lanham Act application, regardless of whether the issue arises as part of the plaintiffs claim or
the defendant's counterclaim.
116. Nine opinions out of the 150 did not decide whether the Lanham Act should apply,
thereby leaving the issue unresolved. The result is statistically significant (p < 0.05 (t-test)). A
slight variation between the district court and the circuit court extraterritoriality rates exists
(61.21% and 60.00%) but is not statistically significant.
117. See supra Part II.B.
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a. Case-Selection Hypothesis
The win-rate theory was first formulated by George Priest and
Benjamin Klein.118 Their explanation of the case "selection effect" has
two facets. First, they describe court dockets as collecting pits for
pathological cases, pointing out that actual court decisions do not
represent a random sample of real-world disputes.1 19 In fact, for
economic reasons, most disputes never reach the litigation stage: if
litigation is more costly than an out-of-court solution, the case will
generally be settled.120 In other words, where applicable law clearly
favors either the plaintiffs or the defendant's case, both sides can save
costs by settling rather than litigating toward a result they both
anticipate.121 Such selection mechanics are set in motion even before
considering litigation, such as when violations pass unnoticed or are
tolerated by rights holders.122
For a smaller group of disputes, the results may differ. These
cases with an uncertain outcome are brought to court by the parties'
rational cost-benefit calculations: the parties' divergent expectations
cause the negotiations to fail, and litigation then becomes the only
way to resolve the dispute.123 Viewed in this light, it is obvious that
the composition of court-litigated cases is skewed and therefore
unrepresentative of the real world.
The second facet of the Priest-Klein theory has become famous
under the shorthand "50 percent hypothesis."1 2 4 Priest and Klein
argue that plaintiffs should win approximately half of their
lawsuits.125 Since cases "selected" for litigation are the ones with the
most uncertain outcomes, litigation is akin to tossing a coin.126
118. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 30 (1984); see also Daniel P. Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty
Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
233, 233 (1996).
119. See Priest & Klein, supra note 118, at 4, 6.
120. See id. at 4.
121. For the economic model, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 779-84 (9th ed., 2014).
122. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 758 (2013).
123. See Priest & Klein, supra note 118, at 12-16.
124. See Kessler et al., supra note 118, at 236.
125. Priest & Klein, supra note 118, at 17-20.
126. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581,
588 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with
Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 341 (1990).
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Apart from the fact that it is supported by mixed empirical
proof,127 this hypothesis also has some theoretical limitations. First,
where the parties' stakes are uneven, their willingness to settle
differs.128 Win rates will vary correspondingly. Since the party with
the higher stakes (e.g., reputational interests beyond the concrete
dispute) tends to settle earlier, the stream of litigated cases ultimately
contains a larger fraction of cases where the higher-stakes party
possesses a relatively better chance of winning.129  Information
asymmetry can also cause unequal win rates.13 0 Finally, the legal
standard that is applied at trial may exert some impact: as Priest and
Klein themselves recognize, a change in the legal standard in favor of
one side might ultimately decrease the other side's chances of
success.131 Yet, more radically, it has also been suggested that,
depending on which substantive law standard is applied, any
frequency of success could be possible.132
b. Intellectual Property-Specific Theories
Win-rate theories have also been formulated in intellectual
property-specific variants. William Landes explains that intellectual
property disputes are often settled even when going to court might be
successful.133 Having higher stakes due to the risk of invalidation or
narrowing of their rights, wary rights holders tend to litigate only
waterproof cases. Accordingly, win rates are high.134 But Landes's
model has been challenged on the basis of an antithetical
characterization of intellectual property owners as "aggressive"
litigants. Under this majoritarian counterconcept, rights holders are
believed to litigate even those cases with dim prospects in order to
avoid defendants raising defenses (e.g., laches or acquiescence) and to
127. For a critique, see, for example, Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 339-40, 355; Kessler
et al., supra note 118, at 249-51; Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 494-95 (1996).
128. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 589; Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 338-39;
Kessler et al., supra note 118 at 237, 242; Priest & Klein, supra note 118, at 24-29.
129. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 589; Priest & Klein, supra note
118, at 40.
130. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 589-90; Keith N. Hylton,
Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 189,
199 (1993); Kessler et al., supra note 118, at 242-43.
131. See Priest & Klein, supra note 118, at 18-24; see also, e.g., Kessler et al., supra note
118, at 244-45.
132. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 127, at 493-94.
133. William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some
Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 750-75 (2004).
134. Id. at 771-72.
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establish a reputation for being aggressive.135 The aim is to create a
"chilling effect" on actual and potential infringers.136 In the end, since
even shaky cases are litigated, win rates should be low.
None of these more specific theories provides a satisfying
explanation for the case population's high extraterritoriality rate in
this Article's analysis. Indeed, the population's higher-than-average
win rate for extraterritoriality openly defies the paradigm of an
aggressive litigant. Besides, Landes's high-stakes paradigm is hardly
compatible with the realities of international disputes, even though it
could explain a rate beyond 50 percent. There, it is unlikely that
rights holders routinely decide against litigation for fear of setting an
unfavorable precedent. Rather, this is a secondary concern when
policing international trademark infringements. Of course, the
plaintiff and rights holder may lose on the issue of extraterritoriality.
But this does not affect the assets' validity or risk a significant
limitation to the trademark's licensing value.
c. A Weak "Weak-Defense Phenomenon"
Two aspects of international trademark litigation deserve
closer scrutiny. The first concerns the merit of a "defense" of undue
extraterritoriality.1 3 7  In international trademark litigation, some
defendants may find it convenient to plead "undue Lanham Act
extraterritoriality" regardless of the actual merits of such a claim. In
many cases, therefore, the defense may be weak or even frivolous.
Accordingly, a low success rate and a high extraterritoriality rate
should be expected. One way to test this hypothesis is by comparing
the extraterritoriality rate with the opinions' word count devoted to
the issue-the assumption being that, if the defense is weak, the court
will not spend too much time or effort on the issue. And indeed, as
Figure 3 illustrates, only a weak relation between word count and
outcome exists. The strong fluctuation of extraterritoriality rates (i.e.,
proportions) among the bars of the graph and the low slope of the
prediction plot illustrate this nicely.138 This result is not too
135. See Beebe, supra note 112, at 579-80; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got
a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 61 (2002) ("I have a theory about how copyright
got a bad name for itself, and I can summarize it in one word: Greed."). See generally LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
136. Beebe, supra note 112, at 579-80.
137. This analysis borrows heavily from Barton Beebe's innovative approach and findings
on the issue of fair use in domestic copyright infringement cases. See id. at 580-81.
138. See infra Figure 3. It is important to note that the plot does not give regard to the
number of opinions in each bar. The coefficient for correlations between word count and
extraterritoriality rate was -0.2545 (p < 0.05).
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surprising when seen from a practical angle: for most defendants,
extraterritoriality is a win-or-lose issue. Many disputes feature
straightforward scenarios of piracy, counterfeiting, or other kinds of
evidently infringing conduct. Accordingly, an assertion of "undue
extraterritoriality" is not just one among several available defenses,
but the only one. If this is true, however, one should suggest rational
defendants to settle weak cases out of court rather than try to defend
their cases half-heartedly on the basis of a weak extraterritoriality
argument.139
Figure 3.
Distribution of Opinions by Proportion of Words Devoted
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Proportion devoted to extraterritoriality
Number of opinions
Proportion applying US law
- Linear prediction of proportion
d. Preselection by Concurrence of Personal Jurisdiction and
Extraterritoriality
Thus, it is a different characteristic that accounts for the
population's higher-than-average extraterritoriality rate. As a closer
analysis shows, the courts' current tendency to extend the Lanham
Act-contrary to what has been suggested140-actually disfavors
domestic parties vis-Ai-vis their foreign counterparts. This is due to
the fact that, in litigation practice, personal jurisdiction and Lanham
Act extraterritoriality are closely related issues.
139. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
140. See, e.g., Popov, supra note 76, at 722 (explaining the pro-US-plaintiff tendency as a
reaction to the lack of protection abroad).
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Relief under the Lanham Act requires more than subject
matter jurisdiction and extraterritorial reach of the law.1 4 1 The court
must also have personal jurisdiction. In order for a court to duly
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, she must be a US
resident or have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum state or
with the United States.142 On this basis, US residents and US-based
entities-no matter what markets they target-are subject to personal
jurisdiction. Many international trademark "infringements," however,
are committed by non-US parties that act abroad at a secure distance
from the reach of US authorities and courts. One need only imagine
the great number of actors necessary to cause the billions of dollars in
losses that result from intellectual property counterfeiting in
international trade and commerce.143  Summoning this class of
potential defendants to a US court is much more difficult than
summoning US-domiciled or US-incorporated parties. US rights
holders experience challenges not only with service of process
abroad1 44 but also with establishing the necessary minimum contacts
with the forum state or the United States.145 Therefore, foreign actors
are more likely to escape litigation-at least with respect to the
United States.
Conversely, US nationals and entities can be expected to crowd
the defendant's bench. Figure 4 verifies this assumption: The
majority of disputes (68.43%) featured at least one US national or
entity on the defendant side. More concretely, 31.58% (42 out of 133)
of cases involved only US nationals or entities as defendants, and
36.84% (49 out of 133) involved at least one US defendant together
with foreign individuals or entities. Only 17.29% (23 out of 133) of the
disputes featured a defendant bench comprised solely of foreign
individuals or corporations.1 46
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. For the minimum contacts requirement as an element of constitutional due process,
see, for example, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
143. For an overview and for estimates of the damages, see, for example, HEMA VITHLANI,
OECD, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING (1998).
144. For a discussion of the international service of process in general, see, for example,
GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 867-964 (5th ed. 2011). For a discussion of service for international trademark
litigation, see Dabney, supra, note 83, at 471.
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k); see also Leslie M. Kelleher, The December 1993 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-A Critical Analysis, 12 TOURO L. REV. 7, 29-60 (1995).
146. See infra Figure 4. In 19 disputes (14.29%), defendant nationality was unclear or
indeterminate.
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defendants comprised solely foreign nationals or entities, US law was
applied in only 32.00% of the opinions.148
As a result, with respect to the higher-than-average
extraterritoriality rate, the concurrence of personal jurisdiction and
extraterritoriality testing can be considered an effective preselection
mechanism. We can thus conclude that, due to the close nexus
between jurisdictional power and territoriality, the stream of disputes
reaching the courts contains a higher proportion of cases fulfilling the
extraterritoriality test standards than does the complete universe of
actual and potential disputes. Evidently, the federal judiciary is far
less a Shangri-La for US rights holders than for foreign infringer-
defendants-which works to the detriment of US foreign commerce.149
2. Variation over Time
Figure 5 illustrates the temporal movement of the
extraterritoriality rate and the movement of two evolving external
factors: the incidence of bad faith defendants and the involvement of
online media in the case population.
Figure 5.
Evolution of Extraterritoriality Rates, Proportion of Online-Media Involvement,
and Bad Faith Defendants (Twenty-Opinion Moving Average)
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--------- Proportion of piracy and intentional infringements
148. It is important to note that there is a statistically significant relationship between
nationality and Lanham Act application only for cases in which the defendants comprised solely
foreign nationals or entities (Pearson X2(1) = 14.1597, p < 0.01).
149. The aspect of hidden foreign-party favoritism reveals a significant defect in the
variants of the Bulova test as currently applied. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Two time periods in the movement of extraterritoriality rates
invite closer scrutiny. With regard to the first phase-the constant
decline starting shortly after 1990 and lasting until the early
2000s-one striking finding is that from 1995 forward there was a
largely parallel downward movement in bad faith scenarios. In other
words, the courts' penchant for extending the Lanham Act appears to
shrink with the decrease of cases in which defendants acted in bad
faith (e.g., counterfeiters). Conventional wisdom, without empirical
proof, has explained that courts tend to find extraterritoriality proper
"whenever they view the defendant's conduct as 'unfair' or
'inequitable."'15 0 This Article addresses the overall importance of a
defendant's bad faith in more detail below.15 1  For now, this
Subsection focuses on the years 1990 to 2002, which were
characterized by a strong correlation between defendant bad faith and
extraterritoriality.15 2
One might be tempted to explain this parallel decline by
referring to the development of international intellectual property law.
Around the mid-1980s, the US government began to negotiate
bilateral agreements, primarily with countries in Asia and Latin
America, in order to ratchet up protection for intellectual property
rights.1 5 3  In addition, from the mid-1990s onward, intellectual
property protection levels in many countries, notably former pirate
and copycat havens, increased as a result of the implementation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 154 and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).1 55 If these efforts, combined with threats of trade sanctions,
had been fully effective, enforcement abroad might have become more
attractive for US rights holders, particularly in cases of piracy and
counterfeiting. Consequently, court dockets would have reflected a
more balanced defendant population, thereby bringing down the
proportions of bad faith scenarios and success rates. Still,
contemporary reports about the effectiveness of local enforcement
150. Alpert, supra note 64, at 136.
151. The overall correlation between defendant bad faith and extraterritoriality is strong.
See infra Part III.C.3.
152. The period's correlation coefficient for extraterritoriality and defendant bad faith is
0.6495 (p < 0.05).
153. Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267, 271-73 (1993).
154. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
155. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299.
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options in important developing nations are mixed.15 6 Thus, musing
about a correlation of this kind-although an interesting
pastime-must remain somewhat speculative. Further qualitative
research beyond the focus of this inquiry is necessary.
With respect to the second time period, from 2000 to 2008,
another correlation appears to emerge. For these initial years
following the introduction of digital communication,15 7 one might
observe a steady increase of online-media involvement in litigation
alongside the rising extraterritoriality rate. Nevertheless, the data do
not confirm a correlation.1 5 8  In any case, after 2010, the
extraterritoriality rate was also visibly uncoupled from online-media
involvement. Therefore, in this regard, scholarly prophets may have
missed the mark by claiming courts had to face a "critical phase in the
law of cyberspace."1 5 9  There was never an apparent correlation
between "Internet cases" and extraterritorial Lanham Act application.
Finally, from 2010 onward, it seems as though the
extraterritoriality rate regressed somewhat to a lower mean. Below,
the Article addresses the overall characteristics of the Steele progeny
as an example of common law evolution.160 Here, suffice it to say that
the handling of Lanham Act extraterritoriality was far less subject to
external impacts than one might expect.
3. Variation by Circuit
Another aspect that deserves examination concerns the
variations among different circuits' extraterritoriality rates. As seen
above, there is a lively debate regarding which circuit test provides for
the most wide-reaching extension of the Lanham Act.161 Keeping in
mind that case numbers are still relatively small, some general
156. See, e.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (1996)
(discussing pre-TRIPS-accession problems); Christopher Heath, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz in
Sridostasien - Ein Uberblick, 46 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT -
INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT.] 187 (1997) (providing an overview of the obstacles of
implementing effective protection structures in Southeast Asia); Graziella M. Sarno, Comment,
Viet Nam or Bust: Why Trademark Pirates Are Leaving China for Better Opportunities in Viet
Nam, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 291, 298 (1996) (discussing the inefficiencies of enforcement in Asian
countries); Thomas E. Volper, Note, TRIPS Enforcement in China: A Case for Judicial
Transparency, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 322-26 (2007) (discussing post-TRIPS-accession lack of
compliance).
157. See supra Part III.A.4.
158. The correlation coefficient was 0.0791 (p = 0.717).
159. Avakian, supra note 81, at 908; see, e.g., Burk, supra note 5, at 730.
160. See infra Part IV.
161. See supra Part II.B.
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tendencies can be observed, yielding a few nonconventional and
counterintuitive results.
Figure 6.
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By looking at a tendency that verifies conventional wisdom,
Figure 6 shows that the Second Circuit is far from being the
spearhead of extraterritoriality. While that circuit remains the
champion with regard to case numbers, its extraterritoriality rate
(48.84%) is below the overall average of 60.67%.162 This number is
particularly dramatic when compared with the Fifth Circuit, which
applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially in almost all of the opinions
decided there-12 out of 13 opinions, or 92.31%.163
In addition-and quite contrary to conventional wisdom-the
Ninth Circuit fails to meet its reputation as a rights holder's haven.
Of course, its overall extraterritoriality rate is 65.85%.164 With respect
to the evolution of this rate over time, however, the circuit has
exhibited a regressive transformation, as seen in Figure 6. Starting in
162. See supra Figure 6; see also supra Part II.B. This divergence is significant at
p = 0.0662 (t-test).
163. The significance of this result is at p < 0.05 (t-test). The only formal outlier
(pre-Steele) in the Fifth Circuit is the dissenting appellate opinion in Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele,
194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952), which was decided long before the American
Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983) dispute
(litigated in 1982 and 1983).
164. See supra Part II.B. The circuit's divergence from the overall average was not
significant (p = 0.2467 (t-test)).
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the 1990s (at a rate of 57.14%), the Ninth Circuit seems to have
constantly increased its affection for US trademark holders. Toward
the end of the century, its extraterritoriality rate was close to 100%.
Thereafter, however, this rate steadily declined until 2016, where it
was close to the overall average. This drastically contradicts
conventional wisdom.165
And even a cursory glance at actual cases-which allows for a
more nuanced perspective-reveals that scholarly commentary was
always more hypothetical than evidence based. From the birth of the
Timberlane test in 1977 until 2002, only 10 disputes were litigated in
the Ninth Circuit (with a total of 12 opinions).166 Between 1992 and
2006, in the era of increased extraterritoriality, only 4 disputes were
litigated-with all 5 opinions therefrom applying US law.167 After
2006, however, the number of actual disputes rose to 25 (with 29
opinions) and the extraterritoriality rate went down to 62.96%.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2002); Reebok
Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 970 F.2d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1992); Ocean Garden, Inc. v.
Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769
F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129
(C.D. Cal. 1998); Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc. v. Cooper Indus. Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045, 1997 WL
910013, at *1-2, (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1997); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Fenton, 835 F. Supp. 529,
531 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GmbH, 757 F. Supp. 1062, 1070 (N.D.
Cal. 1991); Van Doren Rubber Co. v. Marnatech Enters., CIV. A. No. 89-1362 S BTM, 1989 WL
223017, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1989); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 737 F. Supp.
1515, 1518-19 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Am. Sales Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1229, 1989
WL 418625, at *2, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989); Vespa of Am. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp.
224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
167. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900, 906; Reebok, 970 F.2d at 558, 559; Mattel, 28 F. Supp. 2d
at 1142; Leatherman, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045, 1997 WL 910013, at *4; Winterland Concessions, 835
F. Supp. at 553.
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Figure 7.
Case Proportions by Circuit
(Forty-Opinion Moving Average)
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That last aspect also raises the question of whether a diversity
of test variants might have spurred a certain type of forum shopping.
Throughout recent decades, courts in California have been at the
forefront with respect to national trademark litigation numbers.168
Yet, as Figure 7 illustrates, the drastic changes in international
trademark cases that occurred around the turn of the century appear
to be extraordinary. Regarding the number of newly filed cases, the
Ninth Circuit actually took the lead from the Second Circuit in 2007.
Of course, it cannot be concluded with certainty that scholarly wisdom
on plaintiff favoritism in the Ninth Circuit, and a widespread belief
that a plaintiffs chances of winning are higher there, actually caused
this development.169 In any event, however, the Ninth Circuit is now
the preferred forum.
C. Interfactor Analysis
Of the many issues left open by the Supreme Court in Steele,
lower courts found most problematic the lack of guidance regarding
which factor outcomes were essential (if any) or how the factors were
to be weighed (if at all). 170 As we have seen, courts and commentators
168. Sag, supra note 94, at 1088.
169. For a discussion on conventional wisdom, see supra Part II.B.
170. Bradley, supra note 1, at 528.
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adhere to a number of seemingly ironclad tenets.171 This Section
unveils the relations between factors and clarifies some of the existing
wisdom.
1. Overview: Average Word Count per Factor
Figure 8.
Average Proportion of Words Dedicated to the Three Test Factors
(Thirty-Opinion Moving Average)
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Proportion 'effects on US commerce'
Proportion 'conflicts with foreign law'
Figure 8 depicts the proportion of words dedicated to each
Bulova factor in the sample of opinions applying a three-pronged test.
Among those opinions, the nationality factor never received much
attention. While this is not too surprising-after all, nationality does
not usually require much analysis-the conflicts factor's sharp decline
following Steele is somewhat startling. Among the three factors, that
one started with the highest relative proportion of judges' attention.
Starting in the late 1980s, however, it moved backstage. Over time,
the effects factor became judges' favorite plaything, with more than
twice as many words dedicated to it than to nationality and conflicts
combined.172
The picture differs with respect to the group of Timberlane
opinions, as seen in Figure 9. Here, the seven-factor
comity prong-including, inter alia, subfactors on nationality and
conflicts-took the lead in terms of word count. In addition, the
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. The average word count for effects was 490 per opinion; nationality and conflicts
accounted for only 96 and 129 words, respectively.
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effects factor-which finished only second in the Ninth Circuit-drew
less attention in these courts than in circuits applying a three-pronged
test.173
Figure 9.
Average Proportion of Words Dedicated to the Timberlane Test Factors
(Thirty-Opinion Moving Average)
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2. Details: Interrelations Among Factors
Steele did not clarify the interrelations among factors. In
principle, therefore, any of the Bulova factors could be determinative
and dominant-either alone or in combination with another factor.
Court rhetoric and scholarly commentary on these interrelations
abound. Yet the discussion seems to be driven by judicial instinct
rather than by empirically tested facts.
a. Bulova Rhetoric: Factor Dominance or Balancing?
Vanity Fair seemed to provide guidance where the Steele
majority had remained silent. The initial test version that Judge
Waterman suggested in 1956 was straightforward, establishing what
can be characterized as a presumption of nationality-and-conflicts
prevalence in scenarios where both factors are conjointly disfavoring
extension of the Lanham Act:
173. The effects factor received an average of 397 words. For comity, the courts dedicated
an average of 643 words.
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[Tihe Supreme Court [in Steele] .. . stressed three factors: (1) the defendant's
conduct had a substantial effect on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was
a United States citizen[;] . . . and (3) there was no conflict with trade-mark rights
established under the foreign law . . .. Only the first factor is present in this case.
. . . [W]e think that the rationale of the [Steele] Court was so thoroughly based on
the power of the United States to govern "the conduct of its own citizens ... when
the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed", that the absence of
one of the above factors might well be determinative and that the absence of both is
certainly fatal.17 4
The Supreme Court had not mentioned a requirement of effects
"substantiality."175 In addition, a strict analysis of Steele would have
required the three factors to exist cumulatively and without exception.
Therefore, Judge Waterman's tinkering with a possible "absence of
one of the above factors" set the stage for an extension-not to say
distortion-of the initial doctrine.
Indeed, Vanity Fair has regularly been misunderstood. Until
today, the test has been described as prescribing application of the
three factors in a "mechanical fashion."176 In addition, courts and
commentators uphold an idea of test "uniformity."17 7 But Vanity
Fair's initial clear-cut rule on factor relevance began to dissipate quite
some time ago. In 1977, Wells Fargo178 provided an initial strong
impulse for change, explaining that "the absence of one of the factors
is not necessarily determinative of the issue. Rather, each factor is
just one consideration to be balanced in the 'jurisdictional rule of
reason' of comity and fairness adopted by [the court] in
Timberlane[.]"179
In 1983, the Fifth Circuit's American Rice180 precedent
extended the flexibility of factor interplay, implying that any single
factor-and maybe even two-might be dispensable: "The absence of
any one of these is not dispositive. Nor should a court limit its inquiry
exclusively to these considerations . . . . Rather, these factors will
necessarily be the primary elements in any balancing analysis."1 81
That same year, the Western District of New York reintroduced
this out-of-circuit twist to Vanity Fair by holding that "the application
174. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1956).
175. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
176. See, e.g., Feldon, supra note 52, at 664.
177. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1998);
C-Cure Chem. Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F. Supp. 808, 820 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 29:58 ("Courts in the Second Circuit have uniformly used these three
factors in deciding if extraterritorial application is appropriate.").
178. Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 428.
179. Id.
180. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983).
181. Id.
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or absence of one of these factors to [the defendant] is not dispositive
of Lanham Act jurisdiction."182 The Southern District of New York's
1992 King v. Allied Vision and 1994 Warnaco v. VF Corp. decisions
followed.183 Notably, Warnaco clarified that "[n]one of these three
criteria is dispositive of the analysis concerning the Lanham Act's
extraterritorial effect, and a court must employ a balancing test of all
three factors to determine whether the statute is properly
implicated."184
This lenient balancing standard was accepted in other
circuits,185 and it is no surprise that modern commentary describes the
law across all circuits as a "variety of balancing tests."186 Some
commentators have ven gone so far as to explain the "implication of
balancing" as a technique where "a lesser effect on commerce may be
offset by a lower degree of conflict with foreign trademark law."1 87 In
addition, courts and commentators have bent Vanity Fair far enough
to interpret the test as requiring at least a strong showing of two of
the factors in order to overcome the absence of one.188 Ultimately, it
appears the factors of nationality and conflicts, as well as their
combination-the latter of which began as a virtually indispensable
element of extraterritoriality testing-were reduced in rank and
subjected to a widely discretionary evaluation and balancing test.
The courts' rhetoric-particularly in the Second Circuit-is
also interesting with respect to the effects factor. The 1998 Atlantic
Richfield Co. decision provides one example in which the court
insisted on the effects factor's exceptionalism, declaring that "[i]ndeed,
we have never applied the Lanham Act to extraterritorial conduct
182. C-Cure Chem., 571 F. Supp. at 821.
183. Warnaco Inc. v. VF Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); King v. Allied
Vision, Ltd., 807 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 976 F.2d
824 (2d Cir. 1992).
184. Warnaco, 844 F. Supp. at 950. For a recent example in the Second Circuit, see Juicy
Couture, Inc. v. Bella International Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 489, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
185. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 1994)
("The process is a balancing one: no one factor is dispositive, but all must be considered. The
object of the balancing is to determine whether 'the contacts and interests of the United States
are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction."' (internal citations
omitted)).
186. Bradley, supra note 1, at 528-29, 528 n.126.
187. Butts, supra note 80, at 467.
188. See, e.g., Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1994);
Software AG, Inc. v. Consist Software Sols., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 389(CM)(FM), 2008 WL 563449, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2008), aff'd, 323 F. App'x 11 (2d Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Avakian, supra
note 81, at 922 n.96; Butts, supra note 80, at 468; Feldon, supra note 52, at 665 (devising a rule
that requires "effect on U.S. commerce" to exist and "one of the other factors" to be met);
Webster, supra note 80, at 267.
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absent a substantial effect on United States commerce."189 Other
decisions have subscribed to this "no effects, no Lanham Act
application" paradigm, sometimes further suggesting that not only
effects' absence but also their presence may be what ultimately
determines the outcome.190  In the same vein, finally, scholarly
commentary demands a focus on effects as the most determinative
among all factors.191
In sum, practical and scholarly wisdom oscillates between
different versions of "factor mechanics." Steele did not imply a laissez-
faire handling of the three factors. Yet there is virtual agreement on
the fact that a single factor's absence does not preclude
extraterritoriality. Moreover, while the result of the effects factor
test-regardless of its direction-seems to be essential to some, others
qualify effects as one of three equally important factors and,
accordingly, as not necessarily indispensable. Finally, with respect to
the Timberlane test, it is the void of conventional wisdom on the
factors' interplay that is most puzzling. One might attribute this to
the fact that scholarly analyses continue to focus mainly on the three-
pronged test variants, especially the Vanity Fair test, since these tests
populate the majority of opinions. But considering the growing
relevance of the Ninth Circuit's adjudication, a closer analysis is
needed.
b. Actual Numbers: A Tale of Effects
The question of which factor or combination of factors drives
the results can be approached from different perspectives. First, it is
noteworthy that courts often neglect to consider certain
factors-unlike the way they handle multifactor tests in other areas of
the law. 192 Here, the "effects on US commerce" factor dominated the
189. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 192 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998). For a
more recent case, see Rodgers v. Wright, 544 F. Supp. 2d 302, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Indeed, the
Second Circuit has noted that it has never applied the Lanham Act to extraterritorial conduct
absent a substantial effect on U.S. commerce." (emphasis in original) (citing Atl. Richfield, 150
F.3d at 192 n.4)).
190. See, e.g., Software AG, 2008 WL 563449, at *14; Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v.
Costco Cos., No. 99 Civ. 3894(LMM), 2001 WL 55735, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2001); Lithuanian
Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 47 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D.N.J. 1999); Piccoli A/S v. Calvin
Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
191. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 76, at 868-69; Feldon, supra note 52, at 664-65;
Webster, supra note 80, at 269-70; Witherell, supra note 12, at 196.
192. The numbers diverge from the handling of other multifactor tests, such as in the fair
use doctrine in copyright law. As Barton Beebe has shown, courts there usually consider all four
factors. Failure to consider single factors ranges between 6.9% and 17.7%. See Beebe, supra note
112, at 563-64 & n.58.
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courts' inquiry. Courts only failed to discuss or apply that factor in
14.47% of all opinions (23 out of 159). Quite surprisingly, of opinions
that did not make use of the Ninth Circuit's Timberlane test,
"nationality" and "conflicts with foreign law" were completely
untouched, or a decision was left open, in 43.22% and 49.15%,
respectively. The comity factor in Timberlane, by contrast, was
neglected, or the decision left undecided, in only 19.51% (8 of 41) of all
opinions.
Below, Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the number and proportion of
opinions holding that each of the Bulova factors favored or disfavored
Lanham Act extraterritoriality, as well as the opinions'
extraterritoriality rates. Table 2 lists results for the group of opinions
making use of the Timberlane rule of reason. Table 1, meanwhile,
provides the data lumped together for all other test variants.193
Taking the effects factor in Table 1 as an example, one can observe
that, among 63 opinions that found the result of the effects test to
favor extraterritoriality, courts applied the Lanham Act 96.83% of the
time. An even more powerful example can be found in Table 2, in
which the Timberlane comity factor appears to be fully determinative,
both when favoring and when disfavoring extraterritoriality.
In addition, a look at typical factor scenarios provides more
insights. Among the non-Timberlane opinions, 112 ultimately decided
for or against extraterritoriality.1 94 Within this group, 97 made an
express decision on the effects factor.195 Among these, 34 opinions
featured a negative test outcome for the effects factor, all of which
ultimately rejected application of the Lanham Act. Of the 63 opinions
where effects favored application of the Lanham Act, 61 voted for
extraterritoriality. Only 2 opinions-each with both the nationality
and the conflicts factor disfavoring Lanham Act application-fell out
of line with regard to effects' dominance.196 This makes a divergence
rate of 2.06%. Interestingly, effects' dominance is lower in the
Timberlane group. Among the opinions where an express decision had
been made on the effects test (36 out of 38197), 3 did not apply the
193. Since 9 opinions did not decide on the application or nonapplication of the Lanham
Act, leaving the issue unresolved, Tables 1 and 2 cover 150 opinions.
194. Six opinions left a decision on the application or nonapplication of the Lanham Act
open.
195. Fifteen opinions left the factor test open or found effects irrelevant to the outcome.
196. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United Airways, Ltd., No. 09-CV-4743 (KAM)(JMA), 2013
WL 1290930, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013); C-Cure Chem. Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571
F. Supp. 808 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
197. Three of the 41 opinions in the Timberlane sample did not make a decision on the
applicable law. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431 (9th Cir. 1977);
Openwave Messaging, Inc. v. Open-Xchange, Inc., No. 16-cv-00253-WHO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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Lanham Act despite a positive finding of effects, providing for a
divergence rate of 8.33%.198
Table 1: Factor Impact (Non-Timberlane Tests).
Distribution by Outcome
Factor Outcome N % Extraterritoriality rate
Nationality Favors extraterritoriality 43 38.39 88.37%
Disfavors extraterritoriality 22 19.64 9.09%
Other 47 41.96 59.57%




Disfavors extraterritoriality 34 30.36 0%
Other 15 13.39 46.67%
Conflicts with Favors extraterritoriality 45 40.18 88.89%
foreign law
Disfavors extraterritoriality 14 12.5 0%




In the Timberlane group, by contrast, the comity test factor
dominates. In this regard, the picture differs significantly from
nationality and conflicts testing in the three-pronged-test group. In
the latter group, an express finding for the nationality test in either
direction was trumped by the other factor outcomes in 7 out of 65
opinions.199 For the conflicts factor, an express finding was ineffective
in 5 out of 59 opinions.200 However, whenever the comity prong
61951, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2016); Toyo Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kabusikiki Kaisha Tokyo
Hihoon Rubber Corp., No. 2:14-cv-01847-JAD-VCF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77142, at *6 (D. Nev.
June 15, 2015). Two opinions did not decide on the outcome of the effects test. See Vespa of Am.
Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry
Publ'g, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 486, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
198. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985);
Pinkberry, Inc. v. JEC Int'l Corp., No. CV 11-6540 PSG (PJWx), 2011 WL 6101828, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 7, 2011); Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team, GmbH, 757 F. Supp. 1062, 1070, 1072
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
199. Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2001); Ati. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 1998); Aerogroup
Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 152 F.3d 948, 1998 WL 169251, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13,
1998); V'Soske, Inc. v. Vsoske.com, No. 00 CIV 6099 DC, 2002 WL 230848, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
15, 2002); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Costco Cos., No. 99 Civ. 3894(LMM), 2001 WL
55735, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2001); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 2d 720 (N.D.
Ohio 1999); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., No. 95 CIV. 6361(JFK), 1997 WL 607488,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1997).
200. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 537 (6th Cir.
2013) (White, J., dissenting); Atl. Richfield, 150 F.3d at 192-93; Southco, Inc. v. Fivetech Tech.
Inc., 982 F. Supp. 2d 507, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 2001 WL 55735, at
*2; Atl. Richfield, 1997 WL 607488, at *6.
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expressly pointed toward or against extraterritoriality, courts always
followed. There was no divergence (0.00%).201
Table 2: Factor Impact (Timberlane Test).
Distribution by Outcome
Factor Outcome N % Extraterritoriality rate
Effects on US Favors extraterritoriality 26 68.42 88.46%
commerce
(Timberlane test)
Disfavors extraterritoriality 10 26.32 0.00%
Other 2 5.26 0%
Timberlane comity Favor extraterritoriality 22 57.89 100%
factors
Disfavor extraterritoriality 10 26.32 0.00%




Furthermore, correlation analysis provides insight into the
importance of single test factors and their interrelation with respect to
the overall test outcome. Correlation analysis is an approach
generally used whenever the relationship and interactions among
different variables are at issue.2 0 2  Depending on the strength of the
extraterritoriality/factor correlation, the overall impact of single
factors can be evaluated.20 3 Nevertheless, it is important not to place
too much weight on simple correlation analysis because the
coefficients may underreport the strength of correlations between
dichotomous variables.2 0 4 It is critical to keep this fact in mind for the
extraterritoriality/factor correlation, where the outcome for the overall
test and for single factors was coded either as 1 or 0, depending on
whether the test result pointed toward Lanham Act application.20 5
201. For a more qualitative analysis (albeit of a smaller part of the Steele progeny), see
DORNIS, supra note 1, at 171-85.
202. See, e.g., JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1, 64 (3d ed. 2003).
203. Simply put, correlation analysis yields correlation coefficients for single variables
that range between -1 and +1. If this coefficient is statistically significant, it demonstrates either
a negative or a positive correlation between two variables. Any coefficient close to zero (0)
indicates a weak relationship or no relationship at all.
204. That is, variables which are not continuous or quantitative (such as the amount of
damages or the number of words in a decision). See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 202, at 53-55.
205. In addition, the correlations reported in the analysis are weakened by their failure to
take outcomes other than 0 or 1 into account. In the Excel datasheet on file with the Author,
each factor outcome is represented by a separate variable. It is coded with "0" or "1" depending
on whether it "favors" or "disfavors" Lanham Act application. If a court did not discuss the factor,
if it found the factor to be neutral or irrelevant, or if the finding was unclear, the variable was
coded as "2," "3," or other values. See infra Appendix. For the correlation analysis, the original
codes were translated into the variables "favors extraterritoriality" (coded as "1") and "disfavors
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Table 3 presents the correlation analysis for the group of non-
Timberlane opinions. The effects factor most strongly correlates to the
test's outcome, followed by conflicts and then nationality.206 With
regard to interfactor correlations, it is interesting to observe that
nationality and conflicts were closely interrelated with each
other-both when favoring and when disfavoring Lanham Act
application (0.664/0.561). This somewhat verifies the prior finding
that, albeit of little impact when considered alone, nationality and
conflicts can override effects' power when marching together.
Table 3: Factor Correlations (Non-Timberlane Tests).
LA applies/ Defendant nationality Effects on US Conflicts with
extraterrit. commerce foreign law
Favors Disfav. Favors Disfav. Favors Disfav.
LA applies/
extraterrit. 1.000
Nationality Favors 0.447* 1.000
Disfavors -0.523* -0.383* 1.000
Effects Favors 0.838* 0.424* -0.357* 1.000
Disfavors -0.821* -0.287* 0.283* -0.717* 1.000
Conflicts Favors 0.473* 0.659* -0.231* 0.430* -0.317* . 1.000
Disfavors -0.470* -0.223* 0.531* -0.308* 0.056 -0.293* 1.000
Table 4: Factor Correlations (Timberlane Test).
LA applies/ Effects on US commerce Comity (7-factor test)
extraterrit. Favors Disfav. Favors Disfav.
LA applies/
extraterrit. 1.000
Effects Favors 0.841* 1.000
Disfavors -0.740* -0.748* 1.000
Comity Favors 0.947* 0.757* -0.642* 1.000
Disfavors -0.740* -0.394* 0.339* -0.642* 1.000
Table 4 presents the results of the correlation analysis for the
Timberlane group. Unlike the results of the non-Timberlane opinions,
these results pose a stronger challenge for conventional wisdom
regarding the hypothesis of effects' dominance. As the correlation
coefficients illustrate, comity is the factor that determines the test's
outcome.
Finally, Table 5 contains the results of a logistic regression
analysis. Regression analysis measures the influence that various
independent variables have on a single dependent variable. This
extraterritoriality" (coded as "0"). Observations in which the court did not decide on the factor
outcome were also coded as "0." For a similar approach, see Beebe, supra note 112, at 584-85.
206. An asterisk signals that the correlation coefficients are significant at the p < 0.05
level. In addition, it is important to note that the sum of the two correlation coefficients for each
factor does not equal zero. This is due to the fact that the population contains opinions in which
the court did not decide on the outcome for the factor tests in the sense of "favoring" or
"disfavoring" application of the Lanham Act ("0" or "1," respectively). See supra note 205.
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Article's analysis reports the overall finding for the extraterritoriality
test as a function of the outcome of each of the single test factors.
With a correct classification of 94.07% of test outcomes, the model
provides a helpful rounding off for the foregoing analyses.207
Here as well, however, a few caveats are in order. First, one
must keep in mind that the independent variables-in this case, the
factor outcomes-may correlate inter se. If this is the case, a problem
of so-called collinearity (or multicollinearity) exists.208 For this study,
while at first glance it appears that there might be collinearity
between nationality and conflicts,209 a further analysis of the data
reveals that this is not the case.2 10 Second, a concern exists that
regression analysis for binary variables may pose the problem of
so-called zero cell count. This means that the dependent variable (i.e.,
application of the Lanham Act) might be (and, in the study at hand,
actually is) invariant for different values (0 and 1) of one or more of
the independent variables. The prior analysis has already touched on
the implications of this problem, explaining that certain results of the
effects or comity tests predetermine the overall outcome, regardless of
the status of the other factors.2 11 Regression analysis in these cases
may ultimately produce statistically insignificant and exaggerated
regression coefficients and would, hence, be futile. 2 1 2 This is the case
with the Timberlane group, where the dependent variable (overall test
outcome) is largely invariant.2 13 Accordingly, regression analysis will
be limited to the non-Timberlane group.
207. For the regression analysis, all factor outcomes were coded in the form of trinary
variables. In other words, if the single-factor outcome favored extraterritoriality, it received a
"1"; if it disfavored Lanham Act application, the code was "-1." All other results (e.g., "left open"
or "unclear") were coded as "0."
208. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 202, at 419-30. In addition, one might
challenge the validity of regression analysis in assessing the actual technique and process of
decision-making in cases of judicial multifactor analyses. For a discussion of the heuristics issue,
see infra Part III.D.3.
209. See supra Table 3.
210. A test for collinearity reveals VIF factors < 10 and hence helps to verify that there is
no significant interdependence among the test factors.
211. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
212. See, e.g., ScoTT MENARD, APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 75-80 (2d ed.
2002).
213. For general caveats to the interpretation of regression analysis results, see id. at 79.
In addition, one must be aware of the fact that in regression analysis, small samples (<100
observations) must be treated carefully with regard to statistical significance of the results. See,
e.g., FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION 30 (2000).
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Table 5: Regression Analysis (Non-Timberlane Tests).
Dependent variable: Number of observations = 118
Extraterritoriality found (1), extraterritoriality not found (0) LR X2(3) = 125.81
Prob > X2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.7823
Log likelihood = -17.5085 Correctly classified: 94.07%
Extraterritoriality Odds ratio Std. err. Z P> | Z 1 [95% Conf. interval]
Defendant nationality 10.04443 9.300965 2.49 0.013 1.635791 61.67695
Effects on US commerce 42.7801 35.05026 4.58 0.000 8.587009 213.1286
Conflicts with foreign law 5.769177 5.248664 1.93 0.054 .9698627 34.31764
Constant .3566672 .1845912 -1.99 0.046 .1293387 .9835536
As Table 5 displays, the analysis provides more corroboration
on factor relevance and interrelations. According to the odds
ratio-that is, the likelihood of altering the overall result through a
change in single-factor test outcomes-the effects factor is by far the
most influential. With regard to the other factors, regression analysis
appears to suggest that infringer nationality is slightly more relevant
than conflicts with foreign law.
3. Behind the Scenes: Defendant's Bad Faith
With respect to the movement of extraterritoriality rates, this
Article already mentioned that, for certain time periods, there is a
correlation between application of the Lanham Act and a finding of
bad faith on the side of the defendant.2 14  Indeed, a large fraction of
the case population involves piracy and counterfeiting215  or
comparably dishonest activities.2 16 Overall, 57.89% (77 out of 133) of
disputes involve a bad faith element on the defendant side. The
extraterritoriality rate within this group-82.67%-is significantly
higher than the mean (60.67%).217
Correlation analysis verifies these results. For the group of
non-Timberlane opinions, the correlation coefficient for "bad faith
214. See infra Part III.B.2.
215. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 984 (11th Cir.
1995); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 737 F. Supp. 1515, 1516, 1521 (S.D. Cal. 1989);
Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Am. Sales Corp., No. 88-1210 (CBM), 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1229, 1989 WL 418625,
at *1, *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989); A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F. Supp. 47, 48, 51
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
216. Examples include defamation, theft of trade secrets, or improper trademark use
after termination of a license agreement. See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus.
Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1007 (2d Cir. 1997); Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. 1496815 Ont., Inc., No. CV 04-
1194-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 779699, at *2, *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2007); Amway Corp. v. Dyson, No.
1:97-CV-295, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15735, at *2, *17 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 1997); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 685, 692 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
217. This result is statistically significant below the p < 0.01 level.
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favors extraterritoriality" is 0.4898, whereas for "bad faith disfavors
extraterritoriality" it is -0.4804. In the Timberlane group, the
correlation is even stronger, with coefficients of 0.7797 ("favors") and
-0.6717 ("disfavors").2 18 In addition, regression analysis for the group
of non-Timberlane opinions yielded an odds ratio of 2.8775, which is
slightly above the ratio for "conflicts with foreign law" (2.8265) but
still below "nationality" (4.0989) and "effects on US commerce"
(44.1478).219
It is difficult to give definitive reasons for these numbers. Of
course, many test variants implement intent-based elements,
primarily as effects subfactors: Steele itself established the
unlawful-scheme paradigm,220 and the circuits developed further
ramifications-such as the Ninth Circuit's explanation of
"orchestration" as a subfactor of "effects on US commerce," which,
among other things, requires intentional conduct.221 To a certain
extent, therefore, the bad faithlextraterritoriality correlation is
naturally built in.
However, further indicia for causal explanatory factors remain
difficult to find. Indeed, express reference to the defendant's state of
mind remains strangely rare in the opinions. Only a few cases openly
show protectionist attitudes, such as by referring to "American
companies" and losses due to foreign violators "avoiding legal
authority" by acting and hiding abroad.222 In any event, what can be
concluded is the existence of a direct and strong correlation between a
defendant's bad faith actions and the court's application of US law.
Attentive counsel should take note.
D. Intrafactor Analysis
Having viewed the macro perspective, this Section explores the
factor details. A closer look at the status quo, notably the mechanics
that drive single-factor test outcomes, helps to further elucidate the
operation of the overall test.
218. All coefficients are statistically significant (p < 0.05).
219. The Timberlane group does not yield meaningful results in regression analysis. See
supra Part III.C.2.b.
220. See supra Part II.A.
221. See, e.g., Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1991).
222. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952); McBee v. Delica Co., 417
F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005).
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1. "Nationality" or Who Cares Where You Come From?
The raison d'6tre of the nationality factor is seldom called into
question. After all, public international and municipal law both
acknowledge nationality as a valid basis for jurisdiction.223 Citizens
and entities, wherever they act, can legitimately be subjected to the
reach of their countries' laws. Yet, in recent times, the concept of
nationality has been subject to critique. Critics rely primarily on the
fact that today's actors in the global economy-often multinational
corporate entities-are far less attached to political territories than
their predecessors once were.22 4 As a result, tying economic regulation
to the formalities of citizenship seems anachronistic. Thus, although
courts still pay lip service to the nationality factor, the law in action
sings another tune.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court's majority handled the issue
of nationality quite casually when it explained in Steele that "[t]he
issue is whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction to
award relief to an American corporation against acts of trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign
country by a citizen and resident of the United States."225
In a footnote to the following sentence, it continued: "Joined as
parties defendant were S. Steele y Cia, S.A., a Mexican corporation to
whose rights Steele had succeeded, and Steele's wife Sofia who
possessed a community interest under Texas law."2 2 6 In spite of the
defendants' somewhat heterogeneous citizenship status, the Court
continued to refer to Sidney Steele as a single petitioner and based its
analysis on his US citizenship.227  Clearly, the existence of a
Mexican-registered corporation was not enough to change the
outcome. However, it is worth mentioning that it was the Supreme
Court majority itself that set the stage for a watering-down of
nationality. Moreover, opinions after Steele further diluted the
concept of nationality.
In particular, the Ninth Circuit's Timberlane decision opened
the door for the consideration of factors other than strict nationality.
According to the Timberlane test, a formal finding of US nationality is
223. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1987); SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 278 (2d ed. 2012); see also Equal
Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 274 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-87).
224. See, e.g., Avakian, supra note 81, at 925; Butts, supra note 80, at 470; Witherell,
supra note 12, at 217-22.
225. Steele, 344 U.S. at 281.
226. Id. at 281 n.1.
227. Id. at 285-86.
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not necessary.228 Under this test's "allegiance" subfactor, the test may
already point toward application of the Lanham Act if at least one
among several defendants is a US citizen.229 In addition, judges may
consider a defendant's residence or domicile, the corporate ties
between US and foreign defendants, and infringing acts committed by
a foreign corporate defendant's subsidiaries.2 30  Other circuits
embraced this same kind of dissolution through their use of the term
"constructive citizenship."231 Under this paradigm, often combined
with a bad faith element on the defendant's side, the test factor will be
considered to point toward Lanham Act application already if one
among several defendants is a US national or entity, or if a foreign
defendant has US residence or corporate responsibility for a US
entity.232 A small group of opinions, finally, based the finding of
nationality on the parties' prior agreement submitting to US law or
jurisdiction.233  Overall, 20.75% of the opinions (33 out of 159)
incorporated the allegiance or constructive-citizenship paradigms, or
similar arguments, in order to overcome the formalities of
"nationality." The courts applied the Lanham Act in 31 of these
opinions (93.94%).234
2. Raiding the "Conflicts" Fortress
The conflicts factor provides a similar picture of constant
subsurface attrition. Similar to the nationality test prong, not only
228. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
229. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (C.D. Cal.
1998); Van Doren Rubber Co. v. Marnatech Enters., No. 89-1362 S BTM, 1989 WL 223017, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1989); Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 737 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (S.D.
Cal. 1989). For other circuits, see, for example, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise International
Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995); TNT USA Inc. v. TrafiExpress, S.A. de C.V, 434
F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Houbigant, Inc. v. Development Specialists, Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 2d 208, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
230. See, e.g., Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 970 F.2d 552, 556-57 (9th Cir.
1992); Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 419, 428-29.
231. See, e.g., A.V. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace, S.p.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 328,
337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK H.K., Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
232. See, e.g., GAP, Inc. v. Stone Int'l Trading, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 584, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Calvin Klein Indus., 714 F. Supp. at 80; A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F. Supp. 47,
48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
233. See, e.g., Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. 1496815 Ont., Inc., No. CV-04-1194-PHX-SMM, 2007
WL 779699, at *2, *6, *8 & n.13 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2007); Amway v. Dyson, No. 1:97-CV-295,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15735, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 1997); Warnaco Inc. v. VF Corp., 844
F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
234. Under a X2 test of independence, this was statistically significant below the p < 0.01
level (Pearson X2(1) = 24.2826). Of these opinions, 81.82% stem from the Second (11) and Ninth
(16) Circuits.
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has it been muted in interfactor relationS235 but its actual core of
comity-in the sense of preventing conflicts with foreign
lawmakers-has also been eroded at the micro level. The most drastic
modification likely occurred in the Second Circuit. In Vanity Fair, as
seen above,236 Judge Waterman established an initially ironclad rule
of conflicts avoidance: "[W]e do not think that Congress intended that
the [Lanham Act] should be applied to acts committed by a foreign
national in his home country under a presumably valid trademark
registration in that country."237
Foreign trademark rights established an almost
insurmountable obstacle for national rights holders vis-a-vis their
foreign competitors' extraterritorial activities. Yet the rise of
international trade and communication broke this barrier. In 1994,
the Second Circuit changed horses. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer
AG, 2 3 8 the plaintiff sought to enjoin a foreign defendant company from
the use of its "Bayer" trademark, which the defendant had validly
registered in Europe.239 On this basis, the court cut down on Vanity
Fair comity:
[I]f we applied the Vanity Fair test mechanically to the instant case, we would
forbid the application of the Lanham Act abroad against a foreign corporation that
holds superior rights to the mark under foreign law. But such an unrefined
application of that case might mean that we fail to preserve the Lanham Act's
goals of protecting American consumers against confusion, and protecting holders
of American trademarks against misappropriation of their marks. . . . While the
stringent Vanity Fair test is appropriate when the plaintiff seeks an absolute bar
against a corporation's use of its mark outside our borders, that test is
unnecessarily demanding when the plaintiff seeks the more modest goal of limiting
foreign uses that reach the United States. Though Congress did not intend the
Lanham Act to be used as a sword to eviscerate completely a foreign corporation's
foreign trademark, it did intend the Act to be used as a shield against foreign uses
that have significant trademark-impairing effects upon American commerce.240
The consequences of the shield-and-sword metaphor are
apparent: the fact that a defendant is not a US national and that
there may be a conflict with foreign law does not bar application of the
Lanham Act, provided that sufficient effects can be found. And the
Sterling Drug doctrine reflects a general trait of the overall
population: the conflicts factor has been constantly turned and
twisted, if not grinded down. This doctrine provides for a large
235. See supra Part III.C.2.b.
236. See supra Part II.B.
237. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956).
238. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
239. Id. at 736-39.
240. Id. at 746.
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arsenal of divergent "definitions," offering courts maximum leeway to
either consider or avoid concerns of comity.
Analyzing the data, the conflicts factor suffers from a general
lack of attention, in addition to its interfactor weakness and word-
count decline.241 Among the non-Timberlane opinions, 49.15% did not
expressly decide on the conflicts prong at all. 24 2 Examining the entire
case population, moreover, almost half (79 out of 159) contained no
explanation or definition of what exactly would constitute a "conflict
with foreign law." 2 43 When a definition was given, the standard of
conflicts determination was widely divergent. In 46 opinions (28.93%),
for instance, the courts could not find a conflict unless an alleged
defendant either held a foreign trademark registration or had applied
for registration.24 4 In 15 opinions (9.43%), the courts required an
actual or potential inconsistency of litigation outcomes in the United
States and abroad. They found or denied a conflict depending on
whether foreign litigation was pending.24 5 A small group of opinions
required a previous ruling by a foreign court upholding the
defendant's legal right to use the mark at issue-not surprisingly, all
of these opinions ultimately found for an application of the Lanham
Act.2 4 6 Interestingly, only a few opinions directly analyzed foreign
trademark laws or other countries' policies. Only 11 opinions (6.92%)
considered a defendant's argument that foreign law granted a
nonformal right or justification (e.g., fair use defense) or that a foreign
policy required nonapplication of the Lanham Act. 24 7 Finally, a single
241. See supra Part III.C.1.
242. See supra Part III.C.2.b.
243. "Conflicts" is both part of the tripartite test variants and an element of the
Timberlane seven-factor comity prong. See supra Part II.A.
244. See, e.g., Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Warnaco Inc. v. VT Corp., 844 F. Supp. 940, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Calvin Klein
Indus. v. BFK H.K., Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
245. See, e.g., Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1985);
C-Cure Chem. Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F. Supp. 808, 821 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
246. Overall, 7 opinions (4.4%) followed this approach. See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark.
Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 415--16 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Absent a determination by a
Saudi court that [defendant] has a legal right to use its marks, and that those marks do not
infringe [plaintiffs] mark, we are unable to conclude that it would be an affront to Saudi
sovereignty or law if we affirm the district court's injunction prohibiting the defendant from
injuring the plaintiffs Saudi Arabian commerce conducted from the United States."); Reebok
Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 737 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
247. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 & n.1
(11th Cir. 1995); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 96 Civ. 9123(RPP), 1998
WL 788802, at *67 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1998); Vespa of Am. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp.
224, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("Any finding that [defendant] has no right ... carries with it the
potential for tremendous conflict with Indian policy. As evidenced by the Indian government's
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opinion took the parties' prior agreement as a basis for denying a
conflict with foreign law.2 4 8
3. Timberlane "Comity": Just Some Icing on the Cake?
In light of the overall erosion of the nationality and conflicts
test factors, the Timberlane rule of reason presents itself as an
interesting object of analysis. If comity has been neglected
everywhere, does the Ninth Circuit at least rescue it from extinction?
As we can recall, expectations are high: Wells Fargo has been
described as deferring to concerns of international law and comity,
thus guaranteeing more just results.249 Yet more detailed testing also
implies more complications in adjudicating. Therefore, this
Subsection begins with a glimpse at the psychological theory of
judicial decision-making.
Jerome Frank famously suggested that the judging process is
as flawed as any other,250 and many recent empirical studies have
proven him right: one strand of this theory, which is particularly
important for this analysis, suggests that decision-makers, when
confronted with a complex set of factors to be analyzed, tend to
consider only a few of those factors.25 1 They quickly reach a mental
threshold where, once some determinants are analyzed, no additional
information is considered.252 This "core attributes heuristic" is part of
a rational strategy to simplify and accelerate decision-making and, in
some cases, even guarantee accuracy.253 More concretely, it has been
explained that decision-making is often reduced to a maximum of
high level of involvement in this particular licensing arrangement, they have great interest in
whether contracts which comport with their national policy of promoting industrial
independence are viewed as valid in other countries.").
248. See Amway Corp. v. Dyson, No. 1:97-CV-295, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15735, at *15
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 1997).
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 105-06 (1930).
251. See, e.g., R.N. Shepard, On Subjectively Optimum Selections Among Multi-Attribute
Alternatives, in DECISION MAKING 257, 263-67 (Ward Edwards & Amos Tversky eds., 1967). For
legal decision-making specifically, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati,
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 112 (2002); Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive
Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1337-42 (2003); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 905 (2002).
252. See Gad Saad & J. Edward Russo, Stopping Criteria in Sequential Choice, 67
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 258, 261-69 (1996).
253. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Donald E. Speller & Carol A. Kohn, Brand Choice Behavior
as a Function of Information Load, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 63, 65-69 (1974); David A. Sheluga,
James Jaccard & Jacob Jacoby, Preference, Search, and Choice: An Integrative Approach, 6 J.
CONSUMER RES. 166, 171-76 (1979).
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three factors; any analysis that is more complex will be simplified by
input reduction.25 4
Another important psychological limitation to decision-making
is so-called coherence-based reasoning. Whenever different variables
are to be tested, the analysis starts with a mental representation of
the task.2 5 5 In all but the most straightforward scenarios, the aspects
to be considered point in different directions. Each variable then
functions as a constraint on the overall task, putting the decision-
maker in a conundrum.256 As Dan Simon explains, escape from such a
state of inconsistency occurs in mental cycles: "Each and every
constraint influences, and is influenced by, the entire network, so that
every processing cycle results in a slightly modified mental model."257
In other words, the decision-maker will cycle through the mental
model, repeatedly attempting to conform to the model's constraints.
Simon further explains that "[o]ver time, unsupported variables or
those suppressed by other variables degrade and even die out, while
those that are mutually supported gain strength."258 This process
tends toward coherence. Therefore, whenever a state of formal
coherence of decision-making has been reached, chances are that it
reflects a set of initially divergent variables that have been bent and
streamlined.259
Barton Beebe has found proof for both of these phenomena
with regard to, as he calls it, factor "stampeding" in multipronged
trademark infringement tests.260 Since Lanham Act extraterritoriality
analysis also implies multifactor testing, a closer look is needed.
Vanity Fair and its related test variants may not be problematic, as
they require consideration of only three factors.261 Nevertheless, the
Timberlane rule of reason, with its multifactor balancing approach,262
254. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1601-02 (2006) (with further references).
255. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 520 (2004).
256. Id. at 520-21.
257. Id. at 521.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 522; see also, e.g., Dan Simon, Daniel C. Krawczyk & Keith J. Holyoak,
Construction of Preferences by Constraint Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 331, 335 (2004); Dan
Simon, Lien B. Pham, Quang A. Le & Keith J. Holyoak, The Emergence of Coherence over the
Course of Decision Making, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION
1250, 1257-58 (2001); Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow & Stephen J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive
Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 814, 816, 829-34 (2004).
260. See Beebe, supra note 254, at 1598-1622.
261. See supra Part II.A.
262. See supra Part II.A.
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might invite both input reduction and factor streamlining. Indeed,
while Timberlane has been praised as a test that includes "all relevant
factors . . . yield[ing] the fairest results,"263 commentators have raised
doubts. Multifactor testing, critics contend, "permits courts under the
guise of a well-reasoned opinion and in the name of equity to strike a
'balance' which justifies these courts' view of the underlying merits of
a case."264
For this inquiry, the mean stampede score is defined as the
difference between the numbers of relevant factors-that is, effects
and seven comity subfactors-that favor and disfavor
extraterritoriality, divided by the complete number of factors
considered. The mean stampede score ranges from +1.0, where all
factors that have been considered are also held to favor application of
the Lanham Act, to -1.0, where all factors point toward
nonapplication.265 It is assumed that the larger the absolute value of
the mean stampede score, the more stampeding there is-indicating
some kind of simplification or other manipulation of the decision-
making process.
Figure 10 displays a distribution of Timberlane opinions
according to their mean stampede score. The bulk of cases reflect
factor streamlining. Among the 40 opinions that actually applied the
Timberlane rule of reason,266 30 display a mean stampede score of
-0.75 and below or +0.75 and above (75.00%).
263. Avakian, supra note 81, at 923-24.
264. Alpert, supra note 64, at 145.
265. See Beebe, supra note 254, at 1598-622. When courts considered only a few factors
and ignored the rest, the inquiry distinguishes between scenarios in which a court expressly
considered a factor and found the test outcome to be "neutral," and those in which the court did
not give any regard to one or more factors. Factors in the former category were counted as a
"factor considered," hence contributing to the denominator without enlarging the numerator of
the computation. Factors in the latter scenario were completely disregarded. Accordingly, an
opinion in which the court considered only one factor (e.g., effects) and left all other factors
unmentioned would account for a mean stampede score of 1/1 (or -1/1). Quite differently, for
instance, if a court found three factors pointing toward Lanham Act application, one factor
against it, and one "neutral" with the rest being unexplored, the mean stampede score would be
0.4 (= (3-1)/(3+1+1)).
266. Overall, 41 opinions in the population used the Ninth Circuit's test. See supra Part
III.A.3. In Toyo Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kabusikiki Kaisha Tokyo Hihoon Rubber Corp., No. 2:14-cv-
01847-JAD-VCF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77142, at *6 (D. Nev. June 15, 2015), the court-even
though substantially discussing the Timberlane test-did not apply the test to the facts.
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Figure 10.
Distribution of Timberlane Opinions
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A first focus when searching for reasons behind this
stampeding must be on the aforementioned issue of a weak-defense
paradigm that might run through the Timberlane group.267 Then, the
word proportion devoted to a defense as an indicator of its strength
must be accepted-in this case, it concerns the comity-based
anti-extraterritoriality argument. As seen from the linear prediction
plot,268 however, there is hardly any association between stampeding
and defense strength.269
Nevertheless, there is another trait of the population that
deserves scrutiny. As the data indicate, stampeding is more strongly
associated with certain Timberlane subfactors than with others. In
addition to the effects factor, stampeding significantly correlates with
the conflicts, nationality, and allegiance-of-the-parties subfactors.270
The five remaining subfactors, however-concerning the purpose to
267. See supra Part II.B.1.c.
268. The linear prediction plot (for word proportions) is an almost horizontal line.
Although the plot does not consider the number of opinions in each bar, a weighted
approximation might not be too different. After all, in both bars with maximum stampeding
(-0.95 and 1, with altogether 26 opinions), the word proportion per comity prong was close to the
nonweighted prediction.
269. This result is not surprising if one expects both strong and weak cases to settle prior
to litigation. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
270. Specifically, the conflicts factor possessed a correlation coefficient of nearly 0.5, and
both the effects factor and the nationality/allegiance subfactor's correlation coefficients exceeded
0.6 (all with p < 0.05).
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harm US commerce, foreseeability of effects, their relative
significance, the relative importance of the violations in the United
States, and the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance-are less strongly correlated with
factor stampeding.271
Unfortunately, the Timberlane group is still small. It is
therefore necessary to delay testing for more reliable correlations until
additional cases are decided in the future. A general trend toward
stampeding does exist, however. This trend might be due to certain
factors dominating the decision-making process and ultimately
leading to the other factors being stampeded into their direction.
Ultimately, reference to comity may sometimes represent more lip
service than actual international friendliness and open-ended
balancing.
4. "Effects on US Commerce": Global Rights in Disguise
In Steele, the Supreme Court did not expressly define
"substantial" or "significant" effects.272 The majority did mention
"effects," notably "unlawful consequences" of foreign-based activities
and the concept of an "unlawful scheme," which results in "forbidden
effects."2 73 However, it did not specify the precise level or degree of
effects required. This differed from the Fifth Circuit's appellate
decision in Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, where the term "substantial
economic effects" was used.2 7 4  Judge Waterman in Vanity Fair
adopted the Fifth Circuit standard,275 and the requirement has been
an element of the Second Circuit's test ever since. Indeed, it has
influenced the majority of all other circuits' tests.276 It was in the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits where the effects standard was limited to
"some effects."277  Other circuits subsequently invented slight
variations.278 The Fourth Circuit, for instance, has established a
271. All correlation coefficients for these factors were less than or equal to 0.4.
272. See Avakian, supra note 81, at 924; Berner, supra note 12, at 181; Butts, supra note
80, at 452, 463; Popov, supra note 76, at 711.
273. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-88 (1952).
274. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
275. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956).
276. See supra Part III.A.3. For the Eleventh Circuit, see, for example, International
Cafi, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafd International (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001);
Air Turbine Technology, Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
277. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 414 & n.8 (5th Cir.
1983); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977).
278. For the Third Circuit, see, for example, Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, 80 F. App'x
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2003) (leaving the decision open, instead speaking of a "commercial nexus
requirement of Steele"); Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 47 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536
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"significant effects" standard derived from the Vanity Fair
three-pronged test.2 79
Conventional wisdom contends that a distinction between
"some," "substantial," and "significant" effects would also make a
difference in the outcome: specifically, a requirement of
"substantiality" would seem to require a higher threshold than a
simple reference to less qualified effects. Thus, the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits' tests are said to be more favorable to plaintiffs than the
Second Circuit's approach.280 Indeed, at first sight, the data on courts'
rhetoric seem to support the idea that the effects' quality determines
extraterritoriality: Lanham Act application rates fall with the courts'
"verbal" requirements-from 92.31% in the Fifth Circuit to 65.85% in
the Ninth Circuit and, finally, to 48.84% in the Second Circuit.281
Nevertheless, at least with respect to the temporal development of
extraterritoriality rates in the circuits, these numbers require more
careful analysis.282 Furthermore, as revealed by a closer look at the
doctrinal underpinnings of Steele and its progeny, it is a so-far
unexplored aspect that accounts for Lanham Act extraterritoriality.
a. Trademark Universality "Common Law Style"
Under the universality doctrine-a paradigm of nineteenth-
and twentieth-century civil law-a trade symbol was assumed to
signify the same producer of goods or services everywhere on the
planet, at least if the rights holder had already made an investment in
the marketplace.283 In US trademark law, by contrast, universality
never seems to have played a crucial role.2 8 4 The Supreme Court, with
its early twentieth century decisions in Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf 85 and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus
Co.286 -establishing the so-called Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine-put an
(D.N.J. 1999) (leaving the decision between the requirement of "some" and "substantial" effects
open). For the Seventh Circuit, see, for example, Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 838, 842-43 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (combining the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits' tests and
requiring at least "some effects").
279. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994).
280. See Popov, supra note 76, at 711.
281. See supra Part III.A.3.
282. See supra Part III.B.3.
283. See, e.g., DORNIS, supra note 1, at 21-24, 53-63.
284. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 542 ("[U]niversality theory was never embraced
wholesale by U.S. courts.").
285. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 425-26 (1916).
286. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1918).
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end to prior concepts of universal rights in the interstate context.287
Soon thereafter, on the international plane, the Court clarified that
the principle of territoriality generally blocked the international
extension of rights.288 Yet, somewhat ironically, it was the domestic
doctrine of Tea Rose/Rectanus that established the foundation for
transborder trademark rights extension-first in the interstate
context and later completed by Steele in international trademark
conflicts.
As the Steele majority explained, prior to the enactment of the
Lanham Act, courts had already granted relief "[u]nder similar factual
circumstances."289 Looking at decisions made by New York and New
Jersey courts,2 9 0 the majority concluded that the Act's extension to "all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress" could "not
constrict prior law or deprive courts of jurisdiction previously
exercised."291 As a result, the Lanham Act's commerce provision
became a conduit for incorporating common law doctrine into
extraterritoriality testing. Two paradigms of the pre-Lanham Act
common law were "transplanted."
The first paradigm concerns the distinct consideration given to
an alleged infringer's bad faith. In the 1907 New Jersey case Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 2 9 2 the plaintiff held business ties to the
United States and Europe. The defendant was purchasing barrels of
oil in the United States and shipping them to Germany, among other
places, for sale.2 93 The defendant attached the plaintiffs trademark to
these barrels but not before their arrival in Germany. In condemning
the defendant's scheme, which was executed "to a material extent [in
the United States]," the court declared that "[i]t cannot be that the
arm of the court is too short to reach and stop this fraudulent conduct,
or so much of it, at least, as is carried on in this country. . . . [E]ach
287. See DORNIS, supra note 1, at 76-110. For a discussion of the US Supreme Court's
and California Supreme Court's foundations for and the ensuing doctrine of domestic rights'
universality, see id. at 90-93. See also Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617 (1879); Derringer v. Plate,
29 Cal. 292 (1865).
288. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691-92 (1923). For a more recent
decision, see, for example, American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577,
581 (9th Cir. 2005) ("It is now generally agreed and understood that trademark protection
encompasses the notion of territoriality. The Supreme Court ushered in this concept more than
eighty years ago in [Katzel].").
289. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952).
290. George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536, 542 (2d Cir. 1944); Hecker
H-O Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 36 F.2d 767, 768 (2d Cir. 1929); Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co.,
154 F. 867, 876 (C.C.N.J. 1907); Morris v. Altstedter, 156 N.Y.S. 1103, 1103 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
291. Steele, 344 U.S. at 287.
292. Vacuum Oil, 154 F. at 868-69.
293. Id. at 870.
624 [Vol. 20:3:567
BEHIND THE STEELE CURTAIN
step in the transaction was part of a single fraudulent scheme . . . ."294
This passage survived in Steele's paradigm of sanctioning unlawful
schemes.29 5
Furthermore, a paradigm of common law rights extension
entered the majority opinion in Steele by reference to a 1944 Second
Circuit case-George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co. 2 9 6 In this
case, the court classified the parties' foreign-based business activities
into the three categories:
[1] countries where both parties are doing business and the defendants have
established their right by the local law to use the [trademark]; [2] countries where
both parties are doing business and the defendants have not established such
right; and [3] countries where the defendants are doing business and the plaintiff
has not proved that it has ever done business or is likely to do it.
29 7
It is in the latter two categories that the concept of domestic common
law rights extension surfaces.
With its Tea RoselRectanus doctrine,298 the Supreme Court had
provided for a common law-based conception for nonregistered
trademark rights acquisition and protection in the interstate context.
The doctrine continues to apply today, even under the modern federal
statute.299 Tea Rose/Rectanus provides for a geographical restriction
of unregistered rights to the territory in which the mark is known and
recognized and, in addition, precludes the senior user of an
unregistered mark from enjoining a good faith junior user in a
territorially "remote" area of the United States from continued use.300
In fact, although largely unexplored, there is another crucial
doctrinal characteristic regarding the international extension of
trademark rights. In Hanover Star, the Supreme Court limited the
scope of rights protection by reference to the market relevance of
trademark functions: "In short, the trademark is treated as merely a
protection for the good will, and not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business."301  In addition to the
294. Id. at 874.
295. See supra Part II.A.
296. Steele, 344 U.S. at 286-87 (citing George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142
F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944)).
297. George W Luft, 142 F.2d at 540.
298. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
299. See, e.g., Spartan Food Sys., Inc. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir. 1987);
Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 180 F.2d 200, 206 (7th Cir. 1950); Pedi-Care, Inc. v.
Pedi-A-Care Nursing, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 449, 454 (D.N.J. 1987).
300. For this discussion and further references, see MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 26:2.
301. Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 414.
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market/rights connection, the Court presented a concept of interstate
rights extension:
We agree with the court below ... that "since it is the trade, and not the mark, that
is to be protected, a trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of
municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's
goods have become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of
itself, cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no
trader to offer the article."3 0 2
This no-territorial-boundaries formulation by Justice Pitney,
with its radical depoliticization and deterritorialization of trademark
rights, has exerted a thus-far unexplored impact of the pre-Lanham
Act common law on conflicts doctrine. Returning to George W. Luft
and the Second Circuit's explanation that traditional common law
under Tea Rose/Rectanus must be considered in the international
arena:
There remains for consideration class (c) countries where the defendants are doing
business but the plaintiff has not proved that it ever has done business or is likely
to do it. . . . And it is well established that the right to a particular mark grows out
of its use, not its mere adoption, and is not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business [reference to Tea Rose/Rectanus]. Hence if
the defendants are doing business in Turkey, for example, but the plaintiff has
never extended its trade to that country and there is no evidence that it is likely to
do so, the plaintiff has not been damaged by the defendants' Turkish business and
is not entitled to restrain its continuance or to an accounting for damages and
profits with respect to sales made there.3 0 3
In their transnational projection of common law zones of
protection, the judges paid little attention to the fact that US
trademark rights, by definition, might not extend into foreign
territories-notably into a civil law system like that of Turkey. In this
regard, the court's arguments reflect a focus on rights/market
universality that was set in the interstate context concerning intra-US
trademark rights-that is, rights follow markets. Political boundaries
are, at best, of secondary concern.304
302. Id. at 416.
303. George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1944). For a
more recent reference to Luft, see, for example, Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro
Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Since in Bulova the Supreme Court
relied on Luft in analyzing the extraterritorial question presented to it, it remains appropriate to
consider Luft's teaching. In Luft the Second Circuit found it appropriate to enjoin defendants'
activities in the United States which would result in sales in countries abroad where the plaintiff
is doing business and the defendants had not established superior trademark rights under local
law, but not in countries where the plaintiff was not engaged in business or where the
defendants had established trademark rights." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
304. For the proposition that Luft is still good law and for a discussion of its practical
results, see Feldon, supra note 52, at 660-61 ("This rule [Luft] functionally gives U.S. companies
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Not only did the Fifth Circuit's majority in Steele argue along
these lineS3 0 5 but the Supreme Court majority also based its ruling on
the traditional doctrine of use-based and nonpolitical rights: First, it
referred to an unlawful scheme on the part of the defendant. Since
Sidney Steele had apparently acted with improper intent, it was easy
for the Court to conclude that "[i]n sum, we do not think that
petitioner by so simple a device can evade the thrust of the laws of the
United States in a privileged sanctuary beyond our borders."306 The
Court also suggested international projection of the common law
trademark principles. As the majority explained, the counterfeit
watches filtering into the United States from Mexico "could well
reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's trade reputation in
markets cultivated by advertising here as well as abroad."3 0 7
Protection was not founded simply on the defendant's activities and
their effects inside the United States. In addition, a cross-border
osmosis of common law rights provided the basis for enjoining
injurious activities beyond the United States. In the end, the Steele
majority laid the foundation for acknowledging both domestic and
foreign-based goodwill as protectable subject matter. Ultimately,
marketplace extension came to trump political territory.
In sum, therefore, three different stages or paradigms can
explain the extension of common law trademark rights. These
different stages are illustrated in Figure 11. The first stage of rights
extension concerns the genuinely intrastate spread of goodwill-where
the scope of the trademark's area of protection grows coextensively
with the respective product's marketplace. Protection for a common
law trademark ("TM" in Figure 11) is then granted within State A and
as far as the intrastate's marketplace extends (i.e., the area of the
small circle). The second stage concerns the extension of rights
beyond the territory of the state where the right was initially
acquired. This scenario squarely falls under the Tea RoselRectanus
doctrine. Under this doctrine, the scope of common law trademark
rights extends across at least one intra-US state border (between
State A and State B). Here, as well, the right follows the extension of
the marketplace (i.e., the small oval), and it does not halt at the
the equivalent of a foreign trademark registration as soon as they are likely to do business in a
foreign country unless their competitors get rights there first.").
305. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir.) ("Bulova Watch Company,
at vast expense, has built up an asset of good will in the use of its trade mark or trade name
'Bulova', that extends into if not throughout Mexico. If its watches are not actually being sold in
that country now, Mexico may reasonably be expected to be within the normal expansion of its
business."), aff'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
306. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952).
307. Id. at 286.
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border between two states. This doctrine builds on an implicit
understanding of the common law as being the same across the
different states of the United States.308 In this way, it propagates a
concept of nonpolitical trademark rights. Finally, in the third stage,
this concept of nonpolitical and extraterritorial trademark rights has
been brought to an extreme. This is illustrated in the last part of
Figure 11, which explains the international extension of common law
rights under a conception of what we have characterized as the
transnational goodwill paradigm. By ignoring political borders in
international trademark conflicts, the Steele majority effectively
"globalized" the Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine. Ever since, trademark
rights "travel" with the trade across any kind of border, interstate or
international, and, accordingly, also protect their owners in
marketplaces abroad (i.e., the large oval).
Figure 11.
Stage 1: Intrastate rights extension.
United States Foreign country
Mar tplace
TM
308. See supra Part III.D.4.a.
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Figure 11 (continued).
Stage 2: Interstate (intra-US) rights extension (Tea Rose/Rectanus).
Stage 3: Transnational-goodwill paradigm (Steele).
United States Foreign country
b. Stock-Taking: A Gene of Transnational-Goodwill Extension
Returning to this study's data, the use of the subfactors of
"effects on US commerce" illustrates the proliferation of a
transnational-goodwill paradigm throughout the Steele progeny.
When testing for effects, a court will typically start by defining the
Lanham Act's substantive policies, particularly with respect to the
prevention of consumer confusion and deception.309 In addition to
consumer confusion, injury to the trademark owner may indicate an
309. See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005).
Foreign countryUnited States
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effect on US commerce.3 10 Both consumer confusion and injury to the
trademark owner have been broken down into numerous subfactors.
Overall, between 1952 and 2017, 138 opinions (86.79%)
considered one or more of the following subfactors:
* consumer confusion (63 opinions (39.62%))
* diversion or loss of sales (56 opinions (35.22%))
* damage to or adverse reflection on reputation or goodwill
(54 opinions (33.96%))
* damage to the ability to conduct business or earnings and
income that affected the value of plaintiffs holdings or
caused monetary harm or losses to the rights holder in
general (54 opinions (33.96%))
* domestic activities that direct foreign activities, provide
material support for foreign trademark use, constitute
essential steps within the United States in the course of
business consummated abroad, or constitute the
orchestration of foreign activities (50 opinions (31.45%))
* sale or offering of goods abroad with subsequent entering
into the United States (35 opinions (22.01%))
* using or putting goods into the stream of US commerce,
making physical use of the US commerce stream, using
instrumentalities of US commerce, or availing oneself of
business opportunities inside the United States (12
opinions (7.55%))
* misrepresentation (without further specification) (11
opinions (6.92%))
* a few more uncommon factors, such as loaning funds or
transacting bank business in the United States (7 opinions
(4.4%)), the financial gain of a US entity (i.e., defendant)
received from abroad (5 opinions (3.14%)), misappropriation
or tarnishing of trademark rights or goodwill (5 opinions
(3.14%)), and defendant's violation of fair competition rules
(2 opinions (1.26%))
This list can be further specified and categorized. In a first
category, several subfactors can be traced to Steele's unlawful-scheme
paradigm.311 These subfactors cover activities that provide "material
support for foreign trademark use or business activity," undertake
''essential steps [within the United States] in the course of business
consummated abroad," or involve the defendant's "orchestration of
foreign activities." In addition, other subfactors in the first category
reflect a specific aim to protect the rights holder's financial assets or
310. Id.
311. See supra Part II.A.
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her business in general. This is the case with the above-mentioned
subfactors concerning "using or putting goods into the stream of US
commerce," "making physical use of the US commerce stream," "using
instrumentalities of US commerce," or "availing oneself of business
opportunities inside the United States," as well as tests for "damage to
the ability to conduct business" or "earnings and income that affected
the value of plaintiffs holdings" or "caused monetary harm or losses to
the rights holder."
A second category of subfactors focuses on goodwill protection.
This category covers the subfactor "sale or offering of goods abroad
with subsequent entering into the United States" as a direct
descendant of the Supreme Court's post-sale confusion argument in
Steele.312 Whereas this subfactor is expressly limited to the plaintiffs
domestic goodwill, this is not the case for the remainder of the list:
* consumer confusion
* diversion or loss of sales
* damage to or adverse reflection on reputation or goodwill
* misrepresentation
* misappropriation or tarnishing of trademark rights or
goodwill
* violation of fair competition rules
As a look at this study's data reveals, a remarkable number of
opinions based on these subfactors followed what can be characterized
as a transnational-goodwill approach and as a consequence of the
Steele common law pedigree. In these opinions, courts applied the
Lanham Act on the basis of the occurrence of one or more subfactors
abroad or both in the United States and abroad. Both domestic and
foreign-based goodwill were considered to be the actual substance of
the trademark to be protected against invasion and misappropriation.
Some concrete examples below set the stage for a quantitative
analysis.
The Steele majority found effects in potential damage to the
plaintiffs goodwill that extended across the United States and
Mexico.313 By connecting the Lanham Act's jurisdictional grant with
effects on commerce and then connecting effects on commerce with an
apolitical concept of rights that covers all geographic areas where the
owner's goodwill exists, the majority established the basis on which
later courts built extraterritoriality. A number of different aspects of
such common law extensions can be distinguished. The first concerns
the extension of policies underlying domestic trademark and unfair
competition law. This particularly concerns the subfactors "consumer
312. See supra Part II.A.
313. See supra Part II.A.; see also Austin, supra note 71, at 412.
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confusion" and "misrepresentation." As courts in the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits have assumed, the Lanham Act's policies extend
internationally. One example is the Southern District of California's
1989 decision in Van Doren Rubber Co. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc.:
The Lanham Act imposes upon this Court "the duty to protect the entire gamut of
purchasers, including non- English-speaking purchasers, in various countries
throughout the world to which the defendants intend to export their [counterfeits]."
. . . Moreover, "Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices [even] in
foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are
done outside the territorial limits of the United States."3 14
This ruling also illustrates the diversion-of-sales subfactor as
another instrument of rights extension. In Van Doren, the court found
a diversion of the plaintiffs foreign-based sales (in Mexico) and a
resulting "decrease [in] the value of the American plaintiffs
consolidated holdings," as well as direct damage to the "plaintiffs
goodwill not only in Mexico but in the United States."315 In Reebok
International Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
explained:
[The defendant's] sales of counterfeit REEBOK shoes decreased the sale of genuine
REEBOK shoes in Mexico and the United States and directly decreased the value
of Reebok's consolidated holdings. . . . [The defendant's] activities thus affect
American foreign commerce in a manner which causes an injury to Reebok
cognizable under the Lanham Act. 316
More recently, the Southern District of New York openly drew
a direct line from the diversion-of-sales subfactor to the Steele
conception of transnational goodwill:
U.S. consumer confusion or harm to the plaintiffs goodwill in the U.S. certainly
suffices. Financial harm to an American trademark owner whether from the loss
of foreign sales or the damage to the trademark owner's reputation abroad is at the
314. Van Doren Rubber Co. v. Marnatech Enters., CIV. A. No. 89-1362 S BTM, 1989 WL
223017, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1989) (citations omitted) (quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952); and R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Va. Int'l Exp., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 712,
1982 WL 52136, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 1982)). For the entire-gamut-of-purchasers argument,
see Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1180 (11th Cir. 1994); Reebok
International, Ltd. v. American Sales Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1229, 1989 WL 418625, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 26, 1989). See also Pearl Brewing Co. v. Trans-USA Corp., No. CIV. 3:96-CV-3020-H,
1997 WL 340940, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 1997) ("The extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act
is intended to prevent foreign consumers from being confused and American producers from
losing valuable goodwill in their marks abroad.").
315. Van Doren, 1989 WL 223017, at *5.
316. Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 970 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1992); see also,
e.g., Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. 1496815 Ont., Inc., No. CV-04-1194-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 779699, at
*5-6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2007).
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very least, relevant to determining whether foreign infringement has a substantial
effect on U.S. commerce.3 17
Finally, a third aspect of transnational rights extension can be
found in the Luft pedigree of Steele, which is still alive.318 Indeed,
until today, courts have described trademark conflicts as an issue of
defending oneself against competitors in foreign marketplaces. One
example is the Third Circuit's ruling on the scope of an injunction
prohibiting extraterritorial activity in Monte Carlo in Three Degrees
Enterprise, Inc. v. Three Degrees Worldwide, Inc.319 The court there
explicitly referred to Tea Rose/Rectanus and Luft, thereby showing a
principal inclination to find and actually finding protectable common
law rights beyond US borders. The fact that a marketplace had been
established abroad by the plaintiff was deemed sufficient to extend the
scope of domestic rights across national borders:
[The plaintiff, Three Degrees] Enterprise is unable to rely upon a registered mark.
Accordingly, it is entitled to protection only in geographic areas where it has
established a market for its goods. . . . The Court [in Hanover Star], held that the
trademark of a prior user should be protected from infringement by a subsequent
user of the same mark only in areas where the prior user has established a market
for its goods: "Since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected, a
trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or states or
nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have become known
and identified by his use of the mark . . . ." Thus, the senior user of a common law
mark may not be able to obtain relief against the junior user in an area where it
has no established trade, and hence, no reputation and no good will. . .. It is in this
context that the district court concluded that [Three Degrees] Enterprise had
demonstrated "no presence" in locations other than the United States and Monte
Carlo.32 0
Figure 12 illustrates the proliferation of the transnational-
goodwill paradigm in numbers.
317. Rodgers v. Wright, 544 F. Supp. 2d 302, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citations omitted)
(citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952)).
318. For a discussion of Luft, see supra text accompanying notes 296-304.
319. Three Degrees Enters. v. Three Degrees Worldwide, Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357, 1360
(3d Cir. 1991).
320. Id. For more approval of the Luft conception, see Totalplan Corp. of America v.
Colborne, 14 F.3d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc. v. Cooper Indus.
Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1045, 1997 WL 910013, at *1-2 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1997); Dunkin' Donuts Inc. v.
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goodwill abroad and a lower extraterritoriality rate of 52.94% in the
group of transnational-goodwill opinions.
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
What can be learned from these empirical results? Apparently,
much of the conventional wisdom needs to be corrected. But there is
more to the story. Even though this Article's case population is
relatively small, it provides an interesting specimen of case law in
action. Formally, of course, all courts in the population adjudicated on
the basis of the Lanham Act as federal statutory law. However, the
actual doctrine on extraterritoriality is a genuine common law
phenomenon.322 Virtually all opinions evolved on the basis of just one
Supreme Court precedent. On this basis, this inquiry will be
concluded by examining what has become known as evolutionary
common law theory. This additional perspective will provide for more
specific insights into the characteristics of the Steele progeny and into
the path of the law in trademark conflicts.
A. The Theory of Common Law Evolution
Looking at a field of law built on only one precedent evokes
ideas that have fascinated legal thinkers for a long time. Indeed,
"evolutionary" metaphors have been debated among scholars for more
than a century.323 The earliest ideas on this topic emanated most
prominently from Friedrich Carl von Savigny324 and Henry Maine325 in
322. This Article uses the term "common law" here to refer to a body of case law in the
common law tradition that relies on court decisions as the primary source of law. The large
countertradition is civil law, in which the primary source of law is the statutory text. See, e.g., K.
ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 181 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998) (1977).
323. Here, "evolutionary" means the idea that the law-both its micro content and its
macro structure-is shaped by external conditions similar to how living things are shaped by
their environments. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 38, 39 (1985) [hereinafter Elliott, Evolutionary Tradition]. For more on the
strand of theory suggesting an interdisciplinary perspective based on biology, ethology, and
anthropology, see E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
595, 596-97, 617 (1997). For the all-time heroes of evolution theory, see CHARLES DARWIN, THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Charles W. Eliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1859); RICHARD DAWKINS,
THE SELFISH GENE (40th anniversary ed. 2016).
324. Savigny was the founder of the nineteenth-century German Historical School,
contending that jurisprudence rather than abstract legal principles should be considered the
foundation of law. See FRIEDRICH CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 161-62 (Abraham Hayward trans., London, Littlewood & Co.
1831). As he explained, each legal system passes through different stages of development prior to
the point at which it becomes ready to be codified. Id. Early nineteenth-century German law, he
concluded, was not yet ripe. Id. at 161-62, 169.
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Europe and Oliver Wendell Holmes in the United States.326 Even the
US Supreme Court has explained that "[i]t has ... become axiomatic
that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions."327
In recent decades, economics has come to dominate this
discussion. Whereas earlier doctrinal theory was primarily
descriptive-often neglecting to explain why the law developed in a
certain direction and whether its normative content was
desirable-econo-evolutionist theory tries to provide explanations by
relying on the concept of efficiency.328 The basic idea is that inefficient
rules create deadweight losses. The potential beneficiaries of an
efficient rule, therefore, have greater stakes than nonbeneficiaries.
They have stronger incentives to challenge existing inefficiencies.
Accordingly, since inefficient rules are more likely than efficient rules
to be "relitigated," chances are high that these rules will be changed.
This is supposed to happen regardless of judges' individual
preferences. Over time, the argument goes, all inefficient rules will be
replaced by efficient ones.32 9
325. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 44 (London, John Murray 14th ed.
1891).
326. As a cursory look at The Common Law illustrates, Holmes built extensively on both
Savigny and Maine. His most famous and oft-cited explanation with respect to evolutionary
theory is perhaps the following:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
OW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881).
327. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933).
328. For later theory with a more sociobiological impulse, see, for example, Richard A.
Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 665, 665 (1980); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 649 (1980). For an overview, see also Elliott, Evolutionary Tradition, supra note 323,
at 71-90.
329. See, e.g., John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 395 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers
in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 807 (1994); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly
Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397, 398 (1981); Georg von
Wangenheim, The Evolution of Judge-Made Law, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 382 (1993);
Douglas Glen Whitman, Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 753, 775-776 (2000); Wes Parsons, Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE
L.J. 862, 886-87 (1983).
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Yet economists are split on many issues. For one, many
disagree with the basic premise that the common law will inevitably
develop toward efficiency; they suggest that the ultimate equilibrium
in an evolutionary system of common law norms may comprise both
"best" and "worst" legal rules.330  Furthermore, a strong current
disagrees on the extent to which judges' preferences may hinder or
promote efficiency. In one camp are those who downplay the judges'
role in the evolutionary process, and in the other are those who assert
it. In the first camp, for example, is the process-oriented theory,
which suggests that efficiency might be due to the "utility maximizing
decisions of disputants rather than . . . the wisdom of judges."331
Under this notion, judges play a minimal role in pushing the system
toward efficiency. Also in this camp are more critical analyses that
emphasize judges' limited capacities to explore the circumstances of
their decision-making regarding socioeconomic consequences.3 32 They
allude to Friedrich von Hayek's arrogation-of-knowledge paradigm:
since information is decentralized, judges are seldom in a position to
determine what is "efficient."33 3 In the other camp are theorists who
explain the evolution of doctrine by reference to the fact that efficiency
is the most common and rational preference for legal
decision-making.33 4 Finally, economists are split on the existence of
path dependence. Some argue that the doctrine of stare decisis makes
the common law highly path dependent; they note that adherence to
past court decisions creates an inertia that will ultimately stand in the
way of flexibility and adaption, whether toward efficiency or
something else.33 5 Others, by contrast, suggest that judges' individual
preferences exert a beneficial impact on the evolution of efficient
law.
336
330. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (1980).
331. Rubin, supra note 329, at 51.
332. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583
(1992).
333. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, The Common Law as Central Economic Planning, 3
CONST. POL. ECON. 289, 299-303 (1992).
334. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 259 (1979); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39-40 (1993). See also a former edition of
the law-and-economics landmark: POSNER, supra note 121, at 21-22.
335. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 638-39 (2001).
336. See, e.g., Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal
Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419, 422-23 (2003); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei
Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43, 59-62 (2007); Whitman, supra
note 329, at 780-81.
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B. The Realities of the Steele Progeny
The Steele progeny provide an interesting case study to test
some of the hypotheses of evolutionary theory. Under a
process-oriented perspective, two basic questions arise. The first is
whether the Steele progeny are path dependent, which further leads to
whether "precedent" actually determines the evolution of law. The
second question is whether the legal content and actual status of the
extraterritoriality doctrine is efficient.
1. Of Path Dependencies, One-Way Streets, and
Precedent Avoidance
Evolutionary theory in some of its variants emphasizes the
idea that the common law is path dependent.337 As the argument
goes, the law evolves along the lines of early precedent and is thereby
specifically and systematically shaped by the historical pathway
leading to its creation.338 Indeed, early incidents will often exert an
extraordinary and long-enduring influence on the content of the law.
Such a tendency to remain within a predetermined channel may be
problematic, especially if early precedent is flawed or if the alteration
of socioeconomic circumstances calls for a change in direction.339 In
light of such path dependency claims, the Steele progeny offer an
ambiguous picture.
First, in terms of test formulas, there is little doubt that the
evolution of extraterritoriality doctrine is rather static. After all,
Vanity Fair and its three-pronged structure have never been-and,
very likely, will not be in the near future-overtaken as the prevalent
test variant.340 In other words, since it was the three-pronged test
that entered the stage first, this test, rather than the 1977 Timberlane
or 2005 McBee variants, inevitably developed into the "industry
standard." However, a look under the surface of formulas reveals far
less actual dependency in substance.
337. See HOLMES, supra note 326, at 1 ("In order to know what [the law] is, we must
know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately consult history and
existing theories of legislation."). For a more recent discussion, see, for example, Clayton P.
Gillette, The Path Dependence of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 245, 245-46 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000); Hathaway,
supra note 335, at 603-06.
338. Hathaway, supra note 335, at 605-06.
339. Id. at 658-62; see also M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law,
64 U. DET. L. REV. 451, 456-57 (1987) (including numerous references).
340. See supra Parts III.A.2, III.A.3.
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As explained in this Article, conventional wisdom predicts a
drastic circuit split.341 Apart from formal differences, however, such
divergences are hard to find in reality. Rather, there has been a vivid
osmosis of test elements and precedent arguments constantly
vacillating across the whole population. The governing paradigm-as
in other sectors of human culture-has been to copy and transmit
artifacts and patterns.342 This is seen not only with respect to other
circuits' adoption of Vanity Fair's test structure or, for instance, the
more specific concept of "constructive citizenship," 3 4 3 but also with
respect to the fact that New York courts themselves have been
constantly pollinated from outside-as illustrated by the migration of
the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's ideas on "balancing" and interfactor
relations.344  Finally, the migration of the transnational-goodwill
paradigm into virtually all circuits provides impressive proof of a
silent common law homogenization within the Steele progeny.345
The gradual blending of test components and juridical memes
can also be illustrated graphically. Judges may pay lip service to
formulas, but intercircuit cross-fertilization is tremendous. Figure 13
illustrates the distribution of cases for each circuit in which courts did
apply a specific test variant (circles) as well as the occurrence of
citations to the different circuits' precedents (signals below the
circles).346  Evidently, the three-pronged test variants are most
numerous across all circuits (Vanity Fair alone was applied in 35.22%
of all opinions, 19 times outside the Second Circuit). Yet, as already
mentioned, citations to Wells Fargo and American Rice have populated
virtually all circuits.347 In particular, the migration of American Rice
memes illustrates how permeable seemingly formulaic test structures
can be.348
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. On cultural evolution, see the leading Stanford scholars' approach by
L.L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & M.W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION: A
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 3-4 (1981). For the concept of so-called memes and their survival as
elements of human culture, see DAWKINS, supra note 323, at 245-60. For an application of
invention-and-selection paradigms to theories of science and knowledge creation, see KARL R.
POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 106-52 (1972).
343. See supra Part III.D.1.
344. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
345. See supra Part III.D.4.a.
346. In order to illustrate the actual accumulation of test-variant application and citation,
the graphic's indicators "jitter" (i.e., fluctuate).
347. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
348. See supra Part III.A.3.
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Figure 13.
Distribution of Test Variants and Citation Patterns
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In addition, the path of the law has not been too problematic
when looking at test outcomes. As discussed above and illustrated in
Figure 6, the Ninth Circuit's extraterritoriality rate underwent a
constant regression to the mean around the turn of the century.349
Similarly, the Second Circuit's rates oscillated around the overall
mean, and the mean extraterritoriality rates of other circuits
continually declined before ultimately approximating the overall
extraterritoriality rate again.350  Hence, as it currently appears,
results have been smoothed over time. The rule may be stability and
incremental approximation rather than extreme eruptions and
divergence between the circuits. In Justice Benjamin Cardozo's
words, it seems not only that "the eccentricities of judges balance one
another" but also that even across formally divergent circuits'
eccentricities, "constancy and uniformity" ultimately emerge.35 1
Remaining in the Ninth Circuit and relying on Figures 6 and 7,
it can also be confidently asserted that the circuit has not entered into
the cul-de-sac-thus avoiding the ultimate downfall of path
dependency-that Friedrich von Hayek warned of when he explained
that "the spontaneous process of [case law's] growth may lead into an
impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its own forces or
349. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
350. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.
351. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 177 (1921).
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which it will at least not correct quickly enough."352 Conventional
wisdom may have suggested otherwise. Since the Wells Fargo test
never changed on its face, one might have expected a constant
divergence between the Ninth Circuit and other fora, notably the
Second Circuit, when looking at the development of extraterritoriality
rates until 1995. But the exact opposite happened. Accordingly, and
contrary to Hayek's suggestion,353 at least with respect to the outcome,
there has so far been no need for legislation (or Supreme Court
interference) in order to resolve the circuit split. On this basis, one
may even reject the idea that progressive pro-plaintiff courts-such as
the Ninth Circuit-would deepen their preferences rather than step
back in line. As econo-evolutionists have suggested, either by common
law mechanics of precedent adherence or due to rational party choice,
courts with a preference toward plaintiffs will ultimately extend their
stance and arrive at more extreme rather than more balanced rules.3 5 4
The data do not support such a theory.
Finally, at a more general level, one may observe that the case
population reflects a malleable and unstable concept of "precedent."
The doctrine of stare decisis is usually explained to determine a
"seamless web" between past, present, and future precedent, and to
dominate the evolution of common law.35 5 Changes in the law are
seen as the result of solitary incidents and crises, notably statutory
interference or new appellate court precedents.356 This wisdom is
sometimes bolstered by referring to a biological theory of so-called
punctuated equilibria, under which species change little over time but
where phases of change and differentiation-time and again-are
spurred by singular events "punctuating" the usual stability.357
However, what this idea of inertia and immutability overlooks is the
common law's built-in subversion capacity-the inherent leeway for
352. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 88 (1973).
353. Id. at 88-89.
354. For a discussion of this hypothesis, see, for example, Fon & Parisi, supra note 336, at
429; Parsons, supra note 329, at 884-85.
355. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 335, at 622-27; see also, e.g., Fon & Parisi, supra
note 336, at 420.
356. For a discussion of the idea that "[n]othing important might happen except in crisis,"
see, for example, Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 663 (1996). For a similar, albeit more careful, view, see Hathaway, supra note 335, at
640-45.
357. See, e.g., Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82, 92-115 (Thomas J.M.
Schopf ed., 1972). For a critique of the punctuated-equilibria concept-referred to derogatorily as
"jumpy evolution"-see generally RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN 11, 83-84 (1995).
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decision-makers to distinguish old decisions from the case at bar.3 5 8
Looking at the functioning of such distinction mechanics in the Steele
progeny actually suggests that it is favorable to remember the
Llewellyan wisdom that the distinguishing of precedents provides a
major source of legal change.359
Indeed, throughout the Steele progeny, it seemed to be a
technique of precedent avoidance that provided the microstructural
foundation for the transmission and transformation of legal doctrine.
Judge Newman's distinction of Vanity Fair from Sterling
Drug-the latter case not being "on all fours" with the
precedent360-representatively highlights the power of present-day
judges over seemingly immutable old law. Sterling Drug virtually
overthrew the once ironclad threshold whereby a non-US national
acting under a valid foreign trademark abroad should not be subject to
the Lanham Act.3 6 1 One could have called Sterling Drug a change of
precedent, an overruling. At least, it could be considered as overriding
the old rule because it evidently and significantly narrowed the ambit
of Vanity Fair in light of modern-day marketplace conditions.362 More
concretely, it virtually allowed for the basing of Lanham Act
application on effects alone, regardless of the defendant's foreign
nationality and potential conflicts with foreign law. Judge Newman,
however, did not lower his guard by formally and expressly admitting
to having deconstructed an obsolete doctrine. Instead, he elegantly
strode the path of further erosion of Vanity Fair by way of distinction.
2. The Inefficiency of Lanham Act Extraterritoriality
But there remains one aspect where one can see that the road
toward efficiency is sometimes an uphill one. Courts not only have a
tendency to extend the scope of the Lanham Act by fostering a broad
concept of relevant effects but they also adhere to the Steele majority's
demand that the infringer's nationality be given specific
consideration.3 6 3 Like the proverbial panda's thumb explained by
358. For the drawing of distinctions see, for example, MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 71-74 (1988).
359. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
62-63 (1960).
360. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994).
361. See supra text accompanying note 174; see also Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d at 746.
362. For a discussion of the technique for overriding a precedent, see EISENBERG, supra
note 358, at 135-36.
363. For the nationality factor, see supra text accompanying notes 223-34.
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Stephen Gould,364 these test characteristics evolved in past times and
under different conditions, and, at least prima facie, appear to
function well even if "win[ning] no prize in an engineer's derby."365
Still, the extraterritoriality doctrine as it stands is different. Its
penchant for discriminating against US nationals and extending US
trademark protection is neither optimal nor functional. "Nationality"
and "effects on US commerce" were defined in an era when
international trademark infringement was a rare bird. With the
globalization of commerce, realities have changed radically, making it
necessary for the law to adapt.
a. Structural Defect: Discriminatory Lanham Act Application
As explained earlier, econo-evolutionist theory explains that
whenever a norm is inefficient, its "survival pressure"-the chance
that it will be relitigated and transformed toward efficiency-is higher
than on an efficient norm.3 6 6 In other words, a differential in the
parties' cost-benefit calculations drives the erosion of inefficient
doctrines.367 The underlying assumption is that both plaintiffs and
defendants in disputes over inefficient norms will bear all, or virtually
all, costs and benefits. Seldom explored are scenarios where benefits
or costs are dispersed beyond the litigants. Curiously, trademark
extraterritoriality creates such a dispersed inefficiency and, thus,
somewhat resists a turn toward efficiency.
Sometimes,. legal scholars and commentators allude to the
anticompetitive effects of an overextension of domestic trademark
rights.368  Still, dominant opinion generally suggests that
extraterritoriality is a good. Since economic regulation is concerned
with market-related interests and aims to establish and maintain a
level playing field within a certain market, its extension across
national borders reflects the fact that the object of regulation in the
international arena is a multijurisdictional marketplace, not a single
364. This thumb is a sixth digit that, over the course of the bear's evolution, grew out of a
component of the wrist. Not being a genuine "thumb" as in humans or primates, it nonetheless
allows pandas to strip leaves from bamboo shoots more effectively than with a five-digit paw. As
has been concluded, evolution does not require perfection in order for an organism or feature to
survive; it only needs to function sufficiently well. Rather than through a complete
reconstruction, this may be achieved by repurposing elements that initially fulfilled other
functions. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL
HISTORY 21-22 (1980).
365. Id. at 23.
366. See supra Part W.A.
367. See supra Part IV.A.
368. See, e.g., Alpert, supra note 64, at 145; Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1, 90-91 (1992).
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political territory.369  The conclusion is that extraterritoriality is
beneficial for the litigating domestic rights holder as well as for the
interest of domestic industries in international rights protection.370
McBee v. Delica Co. is revealing:
[G]lobal piracy of American goods is a major problem for American companies:
annual losses from unauthorized use of United States trademarks, according to one
commentator, now amount to $200 billion annually. In both the antitrust and the
Lanham Act areas, there is a risk that absent a certain degree of extraterritorial
enforcement, violators will either take advantage of international coordination
problems or hide in countries without efficacious antitrust or trademark laws,
thereby avoiding legal authority.
3 7 1
Indeed, the court's arguments-taken from a 1997 law review
article372-have been welcomed with wide approval.373  This
conventional wisdom, however, is fatally flawed when viewed in the
light of efficiency. It is actually the lack of efficient enforcement
mechanisms that makes trademark extraterritoriality a curse rather
than a blessing. In the domestic arena, states are endowed with the
power of enforcement-granting and protecting rights is their
undisputed domain. At the international level, however, enforcement
powers are limited by the existence of concurrent sovereign
lawmakers.374 Consequently, the scope of rights is limited to the
granting state's territory, reflecting the scope of actual state
power-or powerlessness.3 75 As already described, a facet of this
powerlessness can be seen in the fact that many (if not most) cases of
"infringement" that have occurred abroad never reach a court due to
the lack of personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer.3 76
369. See, e.g., Witherell, supra note 12, at 222-28 (interpreting the Lanham Act as a
so-called market statute).
370. See, e.g., Schechter, supra note 59, at 634-35; see also Popov, supra note 76, at
727-28; Thomas-Gonzalez, supra note 80, at 435-36; Webster, supra note 80, at 269; Witherell,
supra note 12, at 217. As is sometimes contended, the extraterritoriality of domestic law may
even serve as a placeholder in cases where an international agreement on the unification of
regulation has not been achieved. See, e.g., Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic
Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT'L ORG. 459, 469, 485-86
(2009).
371. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
372. See id. at 125; Schechter, supra note 59. For a discussion of the Schechter article, see
supra Part II.B.
373. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 80, at 269; Witherell, supra note 12, at 217.
374. See DORNIS, supra note 1, at 483-88.
375. See, e.g., Jilrgen Basedow, Entwicklungslinien des internationalen
Kartellrechts-Ausbau und Differenzierung des Auswirkungsprinzips [Development Lines of
International Antitrust Law-Expansion and Differentiation of the Impact Principle], 1989 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 627, 638 (Ger.); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 207-08 (1991).
376. See supra Part III.B.1.d.
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Ultimately, the resulting uneven enforcement of rights vis-A-vis
domestic and foreign "infringers" leads to a discriminatory application
of legal standards. If domestic law provides for more protection,
anticompetitive distortion looms. In other words, if the more stringent
domestic regulations are applied predominantly to domestic parties, a
cost disadvantage for these parties in foreign-based marketplaces
ensues.377 The Steele progeny offer an illustration of such inland-party
discrimination: by requiring nationality as one aspect to consider in
extraterritoriality analysis, the courts reduce the prospects of suits
against non-US nationals and foreign entities relative to the prospects
of litigation against US parties.378
The Steele progeny's overall tendency toward extraterritoriality
returns the analysis to evolutionary theory. One need not challenge
the evolution-toward-efficiency concept to find that an automatic shift
may not come naturally in cases of cross-border trademark litigation
because the effects of extraterritoriality are dispersed. Trademark
owners as individual litigants may benefit in the short run; however,
national competitors in foreign markets generally bear higher costs.379
Their combined costs may be greater than the benefits achieved in
individual litigation (or even in a long series of individual lawsuits),
and there may not be sufficient incentives for them to come together
in order to seek to change the rule. Ironically, in this respect,
conventional wisdom in academic writings has hindered rather than
fostered clarification. Voices demanding more rather than less
extraterritoriality have always been i  the majority.380
b. Reconceptualization: The Need for Factor Reinterpretation
Nevertheless, the situation is not dismal. Viewed in the
context of efficiency, all three factors of the Vanity Fair test and its
variants, as well as the Timberlane comity test, are already evolving
377. In this regard, parallels between international tort law and trademark and unfair
competition choice of law are manifest. For the anticompetitive effects of a lex fori approach in
tort conflicts, see, for example, Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global
Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1144 (2007).
378. See supra Part III.B.1.d.
379. Ultimately, of course, it will be the consumers in foreign marketplaces who bear the
cost of anticompetitive discrimination. Yet the direct consequence-and, hence, the actual cost
relevant for computation in evolutionary common law models-is the cost disadvantage on the
side of domestic competitors in foreign markets. For more detail on the economics of
international torts, see Alan 0. Sykes, Transnational Tort Litigation as a Trade and Investment
Issue 18-19 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ. Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No.
331, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=956668 [https://perma.cc/K7EL-
R6C5].
380. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
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toward efficiency. The shift has not been immediate but rather
gradual. A bit of test-factor reinterpretation may thus already suffice
to tip the scales in the right direction.
The tendency of courts toward discriminatory Lanham Act
application is the major source of inefficiency. Although, overall, the
nationality factor may not be the driving force in extraterritoriality
testing,381 it contributes to a problematic characteristic in current
doctrine. The concept of "nationality" is a remnant of the Westphalian
era that has played out in choice-of-law doctrine as one aspect that
may justify state coercion as exerted through choice and application of
a state's own law.3 8 2 In addition, a number of other connections can
justify the choice and application of a state's law. One example is
individual consent, notably when a party resides or travels within a
state. Another is the commercial benefit a party receives through its
contacts with the state.383  Historically, citizenship constituted a
precise proxy for a nexus between sedentary actors' activities, their
consequences, and local regulators.384 However, in today's world, not
only is the connection between conduct and local regulatory policies no
longer guaranteed-for goods, services, and information travel across
the globe with few barriers, sometimes in milliseconds-but, in
addition, formal national affiliations have lost much of their
relevance.385 In a world of mobile actors, where virtually anybody can
cause effects anywhere, nation-state ties no longer constitute the
primary factor for attachment.
These developments are reflected in modern court practice.
Courts have increasingly come to downplay the formalities of
defendants' "nationality" or "citizenship."38 6 Due to formulaic test
structures, however, judges still adhere-at least nominally-to
testing "nationality" and "allegiance." In fact, it seems as if
nationality even saw a revival when the First Circuit made it a
determinant of extraterritoriality in McBee.387 Yet, although under
public international law it seems evident that states can more easily
subject their nationals to national law than foreigners, courts should
carefully analyze whether the concept still makes sense in our modern
world. With respect to the risk of an anticompetitive discrimination of
381. See supra Part III.C.2.b.
382. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1294,
1297-98 (1989).
383. Id. at 1303-05.
384. DORNIS, supra note 1, at 529-31.
385. Id. at 530-31.
386. See supra Part III.D.1.
387. See supra Part II.A.
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US parties, a de-formalization-if not a complete jettisoning-of the
test factor should be considered.
Moreover, a moderate cutting back on the current
rights-extension paradigm is needed. The "effects on US commerce"
test factor must therefore be reinterpreted. Several characteristics of
the effects prong contribute to extraterritoriality, notably with regard
to the factor's division into a number of subfactors.388 Ultimately,
however, it is the detachment of "effects on US commerce" from
substantive trademark law policies that may pose the greatest
challenge to modernizing the doctrine of Lanham Act
extraterritoriality.
US trademark law serves two goals. On the one hand, rights
protection prevents consumer confusion; on the other, it protects
investment in trade symbols.389 Essentially, trademark law aims to
regulate market communication. Rights protection is aimed at effects
that materialize in the consumer's mind when transacting, both by
keeping market information correct and nondeceptive and by
preventing improper goodwill invasion. Trademark-relevant effects in
substantive law are thus inseparable from the marketplace.390
These substantive law foundations are reflected incompletely
at the conflicts level. The doctrine of Lanham Act extraterritoriality
focuses on conduct and largely unqualified "commercial" effects. Both
aspects are essentially detached from the regulation of market
information. As this Article has shown, the list of effects subfactors
contains numerous positions of this kind, such as damage to the
plaintiffs "ability to conduct business," damage to the "value of [the]
plaintiffs holdings," a defendant's "orchestration of foreign activities,"
a "diversion or loss of sales," and even the "loaning [of] funds" by the
defendant.39 1 The most illustrative and drastic example of commercial
effects/substantive policy detachment likely materialized in American
Rice,392 when effects were found to exist in sales in Saudi Arabia
despite the lack of any reverberations for US consumers or for
trademark goodwill in the United States. Instead, the processing,
packaging, transportation, and distribution of US-produced rice were
considered to constitute sufficient activity "within commerce."393
388. See supra Part III.D.4.
389. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275; see, e.g.,
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850, 856-57 (1982).
390. See generally DORNIS, supra note 1, at 273-380.
391. See supra Part III.D.4.b.
392. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
393. Id. at 414 ("[Tjhe defendant's Saudi Arabian sales had more than an insignificant
effect on United States commerce. Each of [the defendant's] activities, from the processing and
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In light of international enforcement ineffectiveness, this
paradigm of unqualified commercial effects overextends the law to the
detriment of US competitors in foreign markets.394 The escape is to
reduce the scope of the Lanham Act. Since policies are confined to the
national territory, effects should accordingly be considered to matter
only if they concern domestic trademark policies-that is, if they
prevent consumer confusion and protect trademark goodwill within
the United States. Consequently, if only territorial effects are
considered, many of the now-accepted scenarios of extraterritoriality
will no longer lead to an application of the Lanham Act.
The same problem exists with respect to scenarios in which the
courts have followed a transnational- goodwill-extension approach.39 5
Such an extension of common law rights across political borders used
to be economically reasonable in the intra-US context of the early
twentieth century. However, it brings unforeseen problems in the
international arena. Of course, one could see the entire-gamut-of-
purchasers paradigm-which suggests the protection of all consumers,
"including non- English-speaking purchasers, in various countries
throughout the world"396-as a good. Moreover, one might argue that
the transnational-goodwill extension inherent in many of the opinions
examined in this inquiry is an essential element of US trademark
conflicts law, in particular catering to the protection of the rights
holders.397 Yet the benefits that such rights extension may have for
individual litigants must be balanced against the overall losses
resulting from impending anticompetitive effects. In any event, more
economic thought is needed.398
The time may not be suitable to reconceive of effects testing in
such a radical way as to suggest a full-fledged shift toward
territoriality, introducing a multilateral conflicts rule similar to the
one that exists, for instance, under European choice of law.399 There,
the provisions on trademark and unfair competition choice of law not
only allow the application of domestic law to infringements that
produce territorial effects but also provide for the application of
packaging of the rice to the transportation and distribution of it, are activities within
commerce.").
394. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
395. See supra Part III.D.4.
396. See Van Doren Rubber Co. v. Marnatech Enters., CIV A. No. 89-1362 S BTM, 1989
WL 223017, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1989).
397. See supra Part III.D.4.
398. For an extensive analysis, see DORNIS, supra note 1, at 491-571.
399. For such a suggestion in US scholarship, see Alpert, supra note 64, at 149; Bradley,
supra note 1, at 509-10.
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foreign laws to foreign-based effects.400 Yet even if the prospects of
such fundamental change may be very low, the current system would
profit significantly from a stringent reorientation toward substantive
law policies and territoriality.
Finally, in this regard, it may be the third test factor-conflicts
with foreign law-that has already undergone the largest
transformation toward a more policy-oriented and
territoriality-oriented interpretation. Once more, a look at the Second
Circuit's remodeling of the Vanity Fair doctrine in Sterling Drug401 is
revealing.
The Second Circuit was confronted with a dilemma. On the
one hand, the nonapplication of the Lanham Act would have failed to
protect US consumers against confusion resulting from the
defendant's use of the "Bayer" trademark in international market
communication. On the other hand, applying the Lanham Act
indiscriminately would have been unreasonable in light of the possible
reverberations for international commerce and marketing activities.
After all, the defendant held valid rights abroad and, as a result, stood
on firm ground with respect to its European marketplace activity.4 0 2
In addition to a careful analysis of relevant effects, leaving the maze
required a refined determination of the point at which distortion in
marketplace communication should actually be considered to be a
"conflict with foreign law." Judge Newman drew the correct
conclusions when he explained that a mechanical application of Vanity
Fair-that is, effectively dismissing the plaintiffs claim-would have
been inadequate:
[U]nrefined application ... might mean that we fail to preserve the Lanham Act's
goals of protecting American consumers against confusion, and protecting holders
of American trademarks against misappropriation of their marks. . . . [Plaintiff]
Sterling . . . seeks to enjoin only those uses of the "Bayer" mark abroad that are
likely to make their way to American consumers. Sterling is not concerned with
[defendant] Bayer AG's use of the mark abroad so long as that use does not enter
the channels of international communication that lead to the United States.
4 0 3
The Sterling Drug approach reasonably repoliticizes the
conflicts factor and thereby helps resolve the conundrum of
modern-day conflicts. Many international disputes involve conflicts
that are unresolvable in the sense that the parties' countervailing
positions-namely, their use of trademark rights in different
jurisdictions-cannot be reconciled by fully enjoining one side and
400. See EC Regulation No. 864/2007, supra note 1, at 44-45. For a discussion of
European choice of law, see DORNIS, supra note 1, at 6-75, 190-220, 491-57 1.
401. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
402. Id. at 737, 746.
403. Id. at 746.
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giving the other side all rights of communication with respect to the
rights at issue. As in Sterling Drug, both parties may act on justified
ground and it may be technically impossible to avoid spillover to other
jurisdictions. In such scenarios the conflicts prong is the perfect place
for courts to undertake a policy-oriented balancing of interests. In
other words, modern conflicts testing rarely allows for a binary
solution in the sense of "the Lanham Act applies or does not apply."
Instead, the scope of extraterritoriality must be determined on a
sliding scale, giving regard to the kind and degree of effects involved
and the losses that ensue from the regulation or nonregulation of the
marketplace activities at issue.4 0 4
V. CONCLUSIONS
Generally, this Article has attempted to demonstrate that the
common law of Lanham Act extraterritoriality is far from deranged or
erratic. Despite the proclamations of both conventional wisdom and
important strands of evolutionary theory, the doctrine has not gone
down a one-way street nor has it fallen prey to fatal path
dependencies. To the contrary, the lower courts after Steele have
promulgated a well-balanced body of case law. A look under the
surface of formulaic test structures and traditional leading-case
methodology unveils powerful currents of homogenization, notably by
means of test element migration and the cross-circuit proliferation of
precedents. In the midst of the external influences of socioeconomic
globalization, the path of the law has been smooth and gradual,
leading to a common ground rather than Babylonian chaos.
More specifically, this analysis has shed light on a few
problematic characteristics of the Lanham Act extraterritoriality
doctrine. Although courts have already started to bend the law
toward more efficiency-through incrementally transforming
"nationality" and "conflicts with foreign law," for example-more must
be done in order to cater to the conditions of globalized markets and
societies. The realignment of extraterritoriality doctrine in this
regard requires both denationalizing the existing test structures and
reducing the currently overextended scope of the Lanham Act.
Counterintuitively, this will serve, rather than damage, the domestic
economy and will benefit exporting actors. After all, the status quo of
discriminatory Lanham Act application primarily disadvantages US
parties to the benefit of their foreign competitors.
Considering the socioeconomic revolutions that both domestic
and international trademark doctrine have witnessed during almost
404. For an extensive analysis, see DORNIS, supra note 1, at 491-571.
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sixty-five years of Supreme Court silence since Steele, one might
expect a new landmark precedent in the near future. But even if the
Supreme Court remains silent, there is no reason to be overly
concerned. In light of the evolution of post-Steele common law, there
is little doubt that lower courts will ultimately take the right turn. Of
course, the multitude of uncoordinated, fractious, and incremental
steps may not swiftly or radically redirect the path of the law. It is
the promulgation of quasi-coordinated results emanating from a
myriad of widely independent decisions that provides for the common
law's viability-or, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo said almost a century
ago, "out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something
which has a constancy and uniformity and average value greater than
its component elements."405
APPENDIX (CASE SELECTION AND CODING)
The Author retrieved the initial group of opinions by
conducting searches in the Westlaw and LEXIS databases. This group
of opinions had a few limitations. For instance, it did not include
disputes that had been settled prior to actual decision-making.
Therefore, the Article's final case population is not a perfectly
representative and unbiased sample.406 However, this problem is
unavoidable and does not invalidate the inquiry. After all, the courts'
handling of Lanham Act extraterritoriality can be confidently
explained on the basis of a case population that is essentially the
actual repository of the common law available to the public.407
There were also potential limitations to the database search
query itself. First, there may have been cases in which neither the
court nor the parties expounded on the problem of extraterritoriality
despite the existence of such an issue.408 Second, a court may have
405. CARDOZO, supra note 351, at 177.
406. For a discussion of the inherent defects and biases in database searches, see, for
example, Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1884-87 (2005); Ahmed E. Taha, Data
and Selection Bias: A Case Study, 75 UMKC L. REV. 171 (2006).
407. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright & Stanton
Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773
(1981) ("In the theory of the common law, these opinions are the law . . . . Their power is
enhanced by the common law doctrine that links them in a chain of influence and causation-the
doctrine of precedent." (emphasis in original)).
408. Concerning the courts' "blind eye" with regard to extraterritoriality, the final
research population actually contains circuit court decisions in which the lower court did not
discuss the issue. See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1006
(2d Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Scanvec Amiable Ltd. v. Chang, No. Civ.A. 02-6950, 2002 WL
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discussed the question of whether the Lanham Act should be applied
without using the word "extraterritorial" or related terminology. With
respect to the first problem, if a court overlooked the issue or if it was
only implicitly handled, the corresponding decision would not appear
in the search results. However, this drawback is not too detrimental,
since the analysis primarily concerned cases that expressly dealt with
the issue. With respect to the second problem, the Author used a
search strategy designed to capture all decisions that made any
reference to the issue of Lanham Act application in international
contexts. The research strategy included two search runs.4 09 The first
run-from 1952 until the end of 2016-in the Westlaw database, using
the connectors (trademark! trade-mark! "unfair competition" "lanham
act") and (extraterritorial! extra-territorial! bulova), yielded a total of
1,501 federal and state court cases. The second search, in the LEXIS
Federal & State Cases database (with an identical time frame and
search terms), yielded a total of 1,428 cases. To produce the final
population, the Author combined both of these lists. The Author then
reviewed each court opinion (majority, concurring, or dissenting) in
order to determine its eligibility for the population. Not unexpectedly,
the search brought up a number of cases where the courts dealt with
extraterritoriality in a context different from or unrelated to
trademark law.4 1 0  Furthermore, this category includes decisions
dealing with forum non conveniens or personal jurisdiction only,411
scenarios presenting the "reverse, or perhaps the mirror image"412 of
the Steele and Vanity Fair scenarios (where the court was concerned
not with the extraterritorial scope of US law, but rather with the
ability to gain protection for trademarks within the United States),413
32341772 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 1, 2002); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Bayer AG, 792 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
409. In 2014, the Author undertook an inquiry that included a search for cases between
1952 and November 2014. The data from this study appeared in a book project completed in
2015. For the less stylized and mostly qualitative bird's-eye view of this first inquiry, see DORNIS,
supra note 1, at 159-89, 572-74.
410. These cases included, for instance, disputes in international copyright, patent,
securities, and bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353,
1366-69 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d
Cir. 1989); Williams & Humbert Ltd. v. Ruiz-Mateos, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 2041, 1991 WL 148283, at
*4-5 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1991).
411. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275
(S.D. Fla. 2001); Royal Gist-Brocades N.V. v. Sierra Prods. Ltd., No. CIV. A. 97-1147, 1997 WL
792905, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1999).
412. Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1998).
413. One type of case in which this problem arises is that in which a court must decide
whether certain activities abroad are sufficient to constitute use in commerce and thereby
receive US trademark protection. See, e.g., Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2003); Buti, 139 F.3d at 102.
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and cases brought under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act.4 14 Finally, the Author excluded all cases in which the court did
not make substantial use of the Bulova, Vanity Fair, or other test
factors. The Author defined "substantial" as including an analysis
beyond the mere mention of the issue or the mere restatement of
another court's finding on the issue.
After performing the database search and the manual
screening and selection, the Author was left with a list of 159 opinions.
The Author then proceeded to code these opinions in an Excel
spreadsheet using four independent coding cycles.415  The coding
instrument's categories were designed to include general information
about each opinion, such as its caption, date, and court level, as well
as specific data regarding, for instance, relations among the
extraterritoriality test factors or the courts' adherence to the common
law goodwill paradigm. In this regard, the coding categories included,
among others, the result of the court's analysis on the application or
nonapplication of the Lanham Act, the parties' nationalities, and the
court's definition and determination of the test factors. The Author
conducted the final statistical processing using Stata 14.1. The coding
instrument, Excel spreadsheet, and Stata file are available upon
request by sending an email to tim.dornis@gmail.com.
414. See, e.g., Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d
617, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003).
415. The Author is well aware of the intricacies of data collection and bias, particularly
with respect to the fact that the data was coded by one person only. For problems of this kind,
see, for example, ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRIcAL
METHODS IN LAW 166-83 (2010); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (2002).
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